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What government does with scarce resources shows what its values are.
This government has set its priorities.
The Honourable Paul Martin'
I. INTRODUCTION
'With the millennium almost upon us, countries and multinational enterprises2
(MNEs) continue to struggle over the effects of the ever increasing globalization of
business. 3 This struggle is an ongoing odyssey that flows in large measure from the
disparate interests of sovereign states and the non-territorial nature of MNEs.4
Sovereign states have witnessed the principles of territoriality being eroded away
by technological advances that offer MNEs the opportunity to carry on business in
1. The Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P., Minister of Finance Canada, Budget Speech, Budget 1997:
Building the Future for Canadians (Feb. 18, 1997) (visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget97>.
2. For purposes of this Comment, I use the term "multinational enterprise" to refer to a business
organization that does business in two or more countries. This type of business organization can take such forms
as a corporation, partnership, joint venture, or otherwise. See generally Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators, Committee
on Fiscal Affairs Report, G-4 (Paris: OECD 1995) (Looseleaf) [hereinafter 1995 OECD report] (stating
multinational enterprises are groups of companies that have business establishments in two or more counties); see
Phillip I. Blumberg, Nation-States and Multinational Corporations, 646 PLI/CoRP 149, 159 (1989) (asserting
multinational enterprises are groups ofcorporations that have common managerial and financial control, and pursue
integrated policies); International Labor. Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M 422, 424 (1977) (defining multinational enterprises as
businesses "which own or control production, distribution, services or other facilities outside the country in which
they are based").
3. See generally Bob Jessop, Changing Forms and Functions of the State in an Era of Globalization and
Regionalization, in THEPOLrrICALECONOMYOFDIVERSrrY: EVOLUTIONARYPERSPECTiVES ON EcONOMIC ORDER
AND DISORDER 102, 103-04 (Robert Delorne & Kurt Dopfer eds., 1994) (discussing how the global economy
diminishes the regulatory capabilities of nation states).
4. See Daniel W. Schenck, Comment, Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Multinational in the EEC: Lifting the
Veil on the Economic Entity Theory, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 495 (1989) (describing how the European
Community has had to stretch the "economic entity theory" to reach multinational enterprises). Multinational
enterprises are characterized by their geographic dispersion whereas sovereign states are distinguishable by the
territory they control or occupy. Id. at 496. Because multinational enterprises are able to influence a country's
economy without creating a legal presence in the country, sovereign states may be unable to hold a multinational
enterprise accountable for their actions. Id.
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an increasingly unified world market that is not limited by geographic boundaries.'
The difficulty of reconciling a MNE's need for a global marketplace with a
sovereign state's need for control illuminates the competing interests facing the
world economy.6 Nowhere are these competing interests more opposed to one
another than in the area of international taxation.7
With the spread of global industrialization, tax authorities and MNEs have
become increasingly concerned about the direction and complexity of international
tax problems.8 The growth in world trade and the corresponding growth in MNEs
have caused sovereign states to develop intricate laws for the taxation of inter-
national transactions. 9 This has led to important problems regarding the taxation of
cross-border intercompany transactions.10
Seeking to achieve a balance between itself and MNEs, Canada has enacted
new rules governing the taxation of cross-border intercompany transactions.' 1 These
new rules are in section 247 of the Income Tax Act and represent Canada's latest
attempt to establish meaningful and functional transfer pricing laws to resolve the
disputes caused by transfer pricing adjustments and double taxation. 12 One major
provision in section 247 is the imposition of a penalty for failing to make reasonable
efforts to determine and use an arm's length transfer price in cross-border trans-
5. See Andrew M. Snyder, Note, Taxation of Global Trading Operations: Use of Advanced Pricing
Agreements and Profit-Split Methodology, 48 TAX LAW. 1057 (1995) (stating advances in technology have made
it possible for financial institutions to conduct their trading activities around the globe, twenty-four hours a day).
6. See Masahiro Max Yoshimura, Comment, The "Tax War" Between the United States and Japan Under
Internal Revenue Code § 482: Is There a Solution?, 12 WIS. INT'LL. J. 401, 403-04 (1994) (discussing the Internal
Revenue Service's intense auditing of Japanese corporations and how this practice may be a breach of the U.S.-
Japan Tax Treaty).
7. See Pamela L. Kayfetz & Leo B. Helzel, Transfer Pricing: Achieving Fair National Taxation of
International Transactions, 3 ANN. StRV. INTL & COMp. L. 193, 196-99 (1996) (stating the taxation of
international transactions by individual nations often results in confusion, disagreement, multiple taxation and
income which goes untaxed).
8. See Thomas F. Field, IFA Congress Participants Tackle International Tax Issues, 77 TAX NOTES 536,
(Nov. 3, 1997) (relating the International Fiscal Association (IFA) Congress held its 51st session in New Delhi,
India in October 1997). Because of the complexity of international tax issues, and the evolving nature of world
trade, the participants often found themselves disagreeing over such tax issues as investment funds, electronic
commerce, cross-border valuations and presumptive income taxation. Id See also 1995 OECD report, supra note
2, at Preface 3 (stating the complex nature of international tax issues is due in part to the non-uniformity of tax
laws among nations).
9. See generally Robert Brown & Michael Alexander, Sovereignty in the Modem Age, 20 CAN.-U.S. L. J.
273, 285 (1994) (asserting the United States' transfer pricing laws are undeniably the most sophisticated, complex
and lengthy).
10. See Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 7, at 194 (stating the fragmentation of taxation of international
transactions provides businesses a significant opportunity to avoid taxation).
11. See Department of Finance Canada, Immediate Release, Draft Legislation and Information Circular on
Transfer Pricing Released, 97-076 (Ottawa: Sept. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Press Release 97-076] (reporting that on
September 11, 1997, the Canadian Ministers of Finance and Revenue issued a joint press release regarding the
release of the draft transfer pricing rules). The Finance Minister noted that the information released was consistent
with Revenue Canada's intention to devote more resources to the taxation of international transactions, and would
make transfer pricing audits more efficient for both taxpayers and Revenue Canada. Id.
12. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247 (1998) (Can.).
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actions.1 3 The penalty is designed to make tax under-reporting and non-compliance
more costly than compliance.1 4 Section 247 also subjects MNEs to substantial
increases in transfer pricing documentation 5 and gives Revenue Canada16 the power
to adjust both the quantum and the nature of amounts that are subject to the transfer
pricing rules. 17 MNEs failing to conduct studies of intercompany transactions to
develop the facts and analysis necessary to satisfy the documentation requirements
will be "deemed" to have fallen victim to the penalty provision in section 247(3)."
Moreover, and not surprisingly, section 247 and Draft Information Circular 87-2R' 9
are modeled after the recent transfer pricing work of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).2° Canada has since 1979 administered its
transfer pricing laws based on the OECD's transfer pricing work.'
Understanding the dynamics between section 247, and the interrelationship bet-
ween Canada's ancillary considerations and procedural matters concerning transfer
pricing, is the key to understanding Canada's latest transfer pricing laws. To ensure
the key for unlocking Canada's transfer pricing laws materializes, this comment is
divided into seven parts. Part 11 defines the complex nature of international transfer
pricing and illustrates why Revenue Canada is concerned about transfer pricing
abuses. Part III provides background information on section 247 by focusing on the
13. See id. § 247(3). For a full discussion of the penalty provision, see discussion infra Section III.C.
14. See Steven Grodnitzky, Revenue Canada Expects Proposed Transfer Pricing Legislation to Become Law
Soon, 97 TNI210-4, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File (reporting that Revenue Canada sees the penalty
provision as an incentive for taxpayers to follow the arm's length principle).
15. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4) (1998) (Can.).
16. See Revenue Canada, 1997 Index to Revenue Canada Services (visited Feb. 8, 1998)
<http:lwww.rc.gc.cal-paulbfindex97/englishabou.rc.htm#themandate> [hereinafter 1997 Index to Revenue
Canada Services] (noting that Revenue Canada is responsible for administering the various tax programs in
Canada). Among its responsibilities is revenue generation, trade facilitation, customs border services and income
redistribution. Id.
17. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2) (1998) (Can.).
18. See id. § 247(4) (stating that for purposes of § 247(3), a taxpayer "is deemed not to have made
reasonable efforts to determine and use arm's length transfer prices or arm's length allocations in respect of a
transaction... unless the taxpayer" surrenders documentation for the transaction entered into which is subject to
the contemporaneous documentation requirements).
19. Department of Finance Canada, Draft Information Circular 87-2R International Transfer Pricing and
Other International Transactions (Sept. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Draft Information Circular 87-2R]. Information
Circular 87-2R sets out Revenue Canada's views on transfer pricing. Id. It updates Information Circular 87-2 to
reflect the developments in § 247 of the Income Tax Act and the most recent transfer pricing work of the OECD.
Id. See generally Tax Management Portfolios, Transfer Pricing: Foreign Rules and Practice Outside of Europe,
897 TM 11 (1997) [hereinafter TM HI] (stating Information Circular 87-2 [87-2R] is for the guidance of Canadian
taxpayers that participate in intercompany cross-border transactions); Highland Foundry Ltd. v. The Queen [1994]
C.T.C. 1, 10 (declaring Information Circulars do not have the force of law, but can be very useful in interpreting
the meaning of legislation).
20. See Press Release 97-076, supra note 11 (declaring § 247 and Information Circular 87-2 have been
updated to conform with the 1995 revised OECD transfer pricing rules).
21. Department of Finance Canada, Immediate Release, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines Released, 95-
059 (Ottawa: July 28, 1995) [hereinafter Press Release 95-059] (maintaining Canada has administered its transfer
pricing laws according to the OECD guidelines set out in the 1979 OECD report).
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influences that have shaped Canada's transfer pricing laws. Part IV examines
section 247 and its interrelationship between the various transfer pricing provisions.
Part V discusses special considerations that arise with regard to transfer pricing in
the area of intangible property, intra-group services and cost contribution arrange-
ments. Part VI examines Canada's Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) program
in light of section 247. Finally, Part VII supplies a conclusion in which this
Comment concludes that NNEs should not be surprised by section 247 or Infor-
mation Circular 87-2R, and should take Canada's transfer pricing laws seriously
because other taxing jurisdictions will follow Canada's lead.
II. THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM DEFINED
The international tax problems associated with cross-border intercompany trade
are attributable to the structure of MNEs.22 MNEs conduct business in more than
one country by adopting legal structures to meet their business needs.23 These legal
structures can be branches, subsidiaries, partnerships or even joint ventures.24
Despite the form, the operating units of MNEs are rarely independent.' Often a
dominant parent or partner in one country will control the operating units in foreign
jurisdictions. 26 As a result, cross-border transactions often take place between the
parent and the units, and among the units collectively." The prices charged or paid
for goods or services in these cross-border intra-group transactions may or may not
reflect market forces and are the transfer price.2' Transfer pricing, therefore, is the
internal price at which tangible goods, intangible property, services, loans and
leases are exchanged between constituent parts of a MNE.29
22. See generally Anthony Scaperlanda, Trade in the 1990s: Is an International Organization for
Multinational Enterprises Needed?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 421 (1994) (discussing the complex structure of
multinational enterprises and the potential for an international organization to monitor multinational enterprises).
23. See generally Richard Herring and Friedrich K. Degreesubler, The Allocation of Risk in Cross-Border
Deposit Transactions, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 942, 973 (1995) (discussing the organizational structures a bank engaged
in international business may adopt).
24. See generally Diane M. Ring, Risk-Shifting Within a Multinational Corporation: The Incoherence of
the U.S. Tax Regime, 38 B.C. L. REV. 667, 678 (1997) (noting that banks frequently operate in foreign countries
through branches).
25. ROBERTTURNER, STUDYOFTRANSFER PRICING 5 (Technical Committee on Business Taxation, Working
Paper 96-10, 1996). This committee was established by the Canadian Minister of Finance to evaluate ways to
improve the economy and simplify administration of the Income Tax Act. Id. This study recognizes that units of
a MNE are rarely self-sustaining or independent. Id.
26. See generally Scaperlanda, supra note 22 (arguing, in part, that an international organization for
monitoring MNEs would frustrate the control parent corporations like to exert over their branches or subsidiaries).
27. See TURNER, supra note 25.
28. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at Preface, I 11 (Paris: OECD 1995) (defining "transfer prices"
as "prices at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and intangible property or provides services to associated
enterprises").
29. See General Accounting Office, International Taxation Problems Persist in Determining Tax Effect of
Intercompany Prices, TAX NOTES INT'L, July 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Txnint File (detailing
that transfer prices are the prices charged by one unit of an organization, such as an affiliate, department, or
315
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In the course of determining taxable income allocable to Canada, it is necessary
to determine a transfer price.30 Determining a transfer price is easy when two inde-
pendently self-interested parties determine by negotiations the price of goods3
because the income received is equal to the price paid.32 This type of exchange is
referred to as an arm's length transaction and is reflective of the free market.
33
Because the two parties to this transaction are acting out of their own self-interest,
and these interests are apparently opposed to one another,34 there is no reason for
Revenue Canada to scrutinize this type of transaction.35 However, associated enter-
prises have no need to compete with each other because they are controlled by the
same entity.36 As such, intra-group trade is not affected by market forces. 37 To
exploit this tax avoidance opportunity, MNEs have used a variety of methods to
divert income from one associated company to another to reduce the tax liability of
the combined operation.38
division, for a product or services supplied to another unit in the same organization); Carl F. Steiss & Luc
Blanchette, The International Transfer-Pricing Debate, 43 CAN. TAX J. 1566 n.1 (1995) (stating that transfer
pricing refers to pricing between related entities and establishments of a multinational enterprise, particularly with
respect to sales of tangible property and sales and licensing of intangible property crossing borders).
30. See generally TM I, supra note 19 (stating although determining a transfer price may be difficult, it
is nevertheless necessary to determining the income of the taxpayer). But see Diane Francis, Here's Hoping Rae
Relentson Corporate Tax, THE FINANCIAL POST, Nov. 14, 1990 (stating transfer pricing is difficult to prove and
even illegal).
31. For the convenience of the reader, less otherwise stated, the word "goods" herein refers to both tangible
and intangible commodities that can be transferred between constituent parts of a MNE.
32. See generally TM In, supra note 19 (stating that the issue of transfer pricing is concerned with
transactions between associated parties).
33. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and
on Capital, 1 1, Art. 9, Committee on Fiscal Affairs Report (Paris: OECD 1977) (loose leaf) (defining the arm's
length standard). Article 9 provides:
[When] conditions are made or imposed between ... two [related] enterprises in the commercial or
financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then
any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason
of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed
accordingly.
Id.
34. See ADAM SMrrli, THE WEALTH 01 NATIONS 13 (New York: Modem Library, 1776) (capturing the
essence of human nature in the free market when he wrote "[niobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate
exchange of one bone for another with another dog.").
35. See generally 1997Index to Revenue Canada Services, supra note 16 (discussing how administratively,
it would be impossible for Canada to scrutinize every international transaction). The government would have to
allocate a substantial amount of money to hire and train auditors, and as a result, the government's broader
economic and social policies would suffer. Id.
36. See TURNER, supra note 25.
37. But see 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1 1.5 (stating taxation authorities should not assume that
all controlled transactions will invariably deviate from what the open market would demand).
38. See Jeffrey C. Schwartz, Note, Trawling for Taxpayers: Section 6038A and Transfer Pricing
Regulations, 42 CASE W. REs. L REV. 993, 996-1000 (discussing the extent of the transfer pricing problem in the
United States); see also Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 7, at 196-99 (discussing the significance of transfer pricing
issues to individuals, tax authorities, multinational enterprises and politics).
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For a simple illustration, take a Canadian subsidiary with a United States (U.S.)
parent corporation. Let us assume Canada taxes corporate income at a higher rate
than the U.S.39 The parent corporation, wanting to maximize the interests of the
MNE, desires to pay as little in taxes as possible.40 Given the choice between
Canada and the U.S., the parent corporation naturally would choose to have the
income generated by the MNE taxed in the U.S. One way the parent corporation
could achieve this result would be to sell the Canadian subsidiary goods at a cost
above the market price. By purchasing the goods at an inflated price, the subsidiary
would experience an increase in its operating expenses. These additional expenses
would reduce the subsidiary's taxable income because the profits from this trans-
action are less than the profits the subsidiary would have realized had the subsidiary
sold the goods to an independent enterprise in an arm's length transaction. At the
same time, this transaction would increase the income of the U.S. parent cor-
poration because the parent corporation is receiving the income generated from this
transaction at a price above the market price.
The inverse of this transaction would also decrease the subsidiary's income and
increase the parent's income. Instead of the parent corporation selling goods to the
subsidiary, the subsidiary could sell goods to the parent. This time, however, the
subsidiary sells the goods to the parent at a price below the market price. Since the
parent is buying the goods at a price below market price, the parent does not incur
expenses that are representative of the free market. As such, the parent's income is
not reduced by an expense that a similarly situated company would experience had
the parent bought the goods on the open market.42 Moreover, since the subsidiary
does not charge the parent an arm's length price, the subsidiary's income is reduced
because it is not receiving the income it would have earned had the transaction
occurred between two self-interested parties.43  This type of intra-group
manipulation justifiably has Revenue Canada and other taxation authorities
concerned that MNEs will use transfer prices as a means of improperly reducing
39. The difference in the corporate tax rate between Canada and the United States is not significant.
Compare I.R.C. § 11 (1996) (listing the highest marginal corporate tax rate in the U.S. in 1997 as 35%), with TM
III, supra note 19 (noting that the basic federal corporate tax rate for 1994 in Canada is 38%).
40. See generally Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 7 (noting it is no secret that MNEs are in business to make
a profit). In most cases, the less a MNE has to pay in taxes, the more profit a MNE realizes. Id. Avoiding taxes by
reallocating income from a higher taxing jurisdiction to lower taxing jurisdiction is one way MNEs can maximize
their collective interests. Id.
41. See generally Eugene E. Lester, Comment, International Transfer Pricing Rules: Conventional Wlidom,
2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283, 285-87 (1995) (describing how a parent corporation can increase its profits
through transfer pricing manipulation).
42. See generally Schwartz, supra note 38, at 996 (providing an example of how a foreign corporation with
a subsidiary in the United States could charge a higher than normal price for goods).
43. See generally Lester, supra note 41, at 285-87 (describing how a parent corporation can increase its
profits through transfer pricing manipulation).
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taxable income by shifting profit to associated enterprises operating in low tax
jurisdictions.'
m. BACKGROUND
Along with countries with high levels of international investment, Canada has
been aggressively scrutinizing the increase in cross-border trade among MNEs.
4s
This increased scrutiny is due in part to the growing influence and role MNEs have
in the Canadian economy.4 It is estimated that MNEs account for sixty percent of
all global trade,47 while foreign trade accounts for roughly forty percent of the
economic activity in Canada.48 Of this forty percent, it is estimated that seventy
percent of that trade is between associated enterprises.49 Since Canada's economic
growth is dependent upon foreign trade, the Canadian government cannot escape
taking steps to make the country more attractive to MNEs.50 Yet the Canadian
government must walk a fine line because although MNEs bring jobs, technology
44. See generally Nathan Boidman, Canadian Transfer Pricing Rules: Indalex v. The Queen, 15 TAX
MGMT. INT'L J. 239, 242-48 (1986) (analyzing Indalex v. The Queen [1986] 86 D.T.C. 6039, a transshipment
arrangement that Revenue Canada characterized as a sham pricing arrangement).
45. See Ernst & Young, Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing 1997 Global Survey, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 183-
105, Sept. 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File (noting that among the nearly 400 multinational
parent corporations surveyed in 1997, 80% expect to face a transfer pricing examination by the end of 1999). Of
the survey respondents based in Canada, 92% believe it is likely that they will be subject to a transfer pricing
examination by Revenue Canada by the end of 1999. Id. Every year since 1995, Ernst & Young has commissioned
a worldwide survey on the practices and trends of transfer pricing. Id.
46. See Emma J. Purdy & Jeffrey S. Zanchelli, Revenue Canada Steps Up Scrutiny of Cross-Border
Management Fees, 7 J. INT'L TAX'N 397, 398 (1996) (stating Revenue Canada's frequent audit adjustments of
management fees is attributable, in part, to many multinationals centralizing their head offices); Elizabeth Schwinn,
Transfer Pricing: Revenue Canada Official Downplays Impact of Pmposed Transfer Pricing Laws, 189 DAILY TAX
REPORT G-1 (1997), available in WL 189 DTR G-1 (reporting the director of Revenue Canada considers Canada's
new transfer pricing laws necessary to sustain Canada's growth in international trade and to monitor the increase
in cross-border transactions between related parties); see also Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 7, at 196 (stating
business is the most influential force for change in the world).
47. See Jeffrey Owens, Emerging Issues in Tax Reform: The Perspective of an International Bureaucrat,
15 TAX NOTES INT'L 2035, 2053 (1997).
48. See Eric Beauchesne, Feds Target Tax Havens, Revenue Lass: Revenue Candda to Tighten Lucrative
Tax Loophole, OTrAWA CrrIzEN, Sept. 10, 1997 (visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http://www.ottawacitizen.com/business/
970910/1145675.html>.
49. Id
50. See Multilateral Investment Pact Serves Canada's Interests, THE FINANCIAL POST, Nov. 7, 1997 at 1,
available in 1997 WL 14959345 (arguing Canada's economic health is dependent upon Canada attracting
international investment).
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and investment, MNEs operate out of their own self-interest.5 One of these interests
is tax avoidance.52
While transfer pricing laws go a long way towards protecting the Canadian tax
base by assigning market prices to related-party transactions, Revenue Canada has
not been content to rely solely on the honor system with MNEs. 53 Revenue Canada
has significantly increased the number of audits it performs on corporations that
enter into cross-border transactions.- 4 In fact, Revenue Canada makes no secret of
the fact that it selects MNEs with Canadian cross-border transactions as likely audit
candidates.55 By the year 2000, it is estimated that the number of international
auditors in Canada will have increased by more than 400 percent from the 1993
level.56 This evidence strongly suggests that Revenue Canada does not intend to
have the Canadian tax base eroded by MNEs under-reporting their income.5
Moreover, Canada's tightening of its transfer pricing laws is strong evidence that
Canada does not intended to sit idly by as other countries intimidate MNEs into
over-reporting their income. 8 By enacting tough statutory transfer pricing rules and
adopting the recommendations in the 1995 OECD report, Canada has taken the first
step to ensure taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to controlled trans-
actions.59
51. Neville Nankivell, Ottawa Should Throw the Door Wide Open to Foreign Investment: Manley and
Others Argue for a More Flexible Approach But This is Not an Attitude Shared Widely in the Liberal Caucus, THE
FINANCIAL POsT, Jan. 4, 1997 at 1, available in 1997 WL 4084159 (discussing the benefits of foreign-based
multinationals in the Canadian economy).
52. See Lester, supra note 41, at 286 (stating tax avoidance is always an interest of a multinational
enterprise).
53. See Charles F. Connolly, Comment, The New Transfer Pricing and Penalty Regulations: Increased
Compliance, Increased Burdens, and the Search for a Safe Harbor, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 339 (1995). In all
fairness to Revenue Canada, few tax authorities rely on the honor system. Id. The United States has set up an
elaborate framework for monitoring inaccurate transfer pricing arrangements. Id.
54. See generally Martin Przysuski & Esta Mikhail, How to Prepare for an International Audit in Canada,
14 TAX NoTES INT'L 937 (1997) (discussing how Revenue Canada approaches auditing international transactions,
and how Canadian taxpayers can benefit by knowing ahead of time what Revenue Canada will be seeking); see also
Purdy & Zanchelli, supra note 46, at 397 (discussing the significant increase in transfer pricing audits by Revenue
Canada over management fees charged by the non-Canadian parent corporation to the Canadian subsidiary).
55. See Przysuski & Mikhail, supra note 54, at 937 (stating that Revenue Canada selects MNEs for transfer
pricing audits based on Form T106). Using the authors' words, "[tihis means that multinational corporations with
Canadian cross-border transactions are likely to be selected for audit." Id. Przysuski and Mikhail are two
international tax auditors in Revenue Canada. Id.
56. See Ernst & Young, supra note 45, at 83 (stating the number of transfer pricing audits in Canada by
the year 2000 is expected to grow sevenfold since 1993, and that the number of international auditors is expected
to increase by 400% over this same time period).
57. See Alan Toulin, Ottawa Plans to 7Ighten Transfer Pricing Rules, THE FINANCIAL POST, Sept. 12, 1997
(reporting Finance Minister Paul Martin believes that § 247 will help protect Canada's tax base).
58. See Rob O'Conner and Alan Shapiro, Canada Proposes Major Transfer Pricing Changes, 97 TAX
NomS TODAY 38-8 (Feb. 26, 1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File (declaring Canada's transfer
pricing penalty provision is an attempt to protect the Canadian tax base from the U.S. transfer pricing penalty).
59. See generally Peter Menyasz & Sindhu 0. Hirani, Transfer Pricing: Canadian Transfer Pricing
Proposal Includes New Documentation Rules, Stiff Penalties, 177 DAILY TAX REPORT GG-1 (1997), available in
WL 177 DTR GG-1 (stating that Revenue Canada has complained about the growing volume and complexity of
1998 / Canada's Transfer Pricing Laws
A. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Notwithstanding the United States, the biggest substantive influence on
Canada's past and present transfer pricing laws has been the OECD.6 Canada has
openly endorsed the principles and approaches contained in the 1979 OECD trans-
fer pricing report.61 The 1979 OECD report endorsed the arm's length principle as
the international standard for dealing with transfer pricing issues62 and developed
the transfer pricing methods for determining whether prices on transactions under-
taken by related parties in different countries are in accordance with the arm's
length principle.63 In 1987, Revenue Canada incorporated much of the 1979 OECD
report into Information Circular 87-2 as guidance for taxpayers on how the arm's
length principle would be interpreted with respect to Canada's statutory transfer
pricing laws.64 When the circular was updated in 1997, Revenue Canada again
relied on the OECD's transfer pricing work. 65
Since the release of the 1979 OECD report, the OECD has followed up with
transfer pricing reports in 19846 and 1995.67 While the 1984 OECD report dealt
with mutual agreement procedures, banking, and the allocation of central manage-
ment and service costs, the 1995 OECD report involved a comprehensive review
and revision of transfer pricing issues to reflect recent developments in the member
countries.68 In a news release issued shortly after the 1995 report was published,
Canada endorsed the report and observed that its current transfer pricing practices
embraced the OECD guidelines set out in the 1979 report and outlined in Infor-
intra-group cross-border transactions).
60. See Steiss & Blanchette, supra note 29, at 1569,1593; see also Draft Information Circular 87.2R, supra
note 19, at I 1 (stating Canada's transfer pricing laws reflect the work of the OECD).
61. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Transfer Pricing and Multinational
Enterprises, Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (Paris: OECD, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 OECD
report]; Scott Wilkie, A Clearer Picture: Canadian Transfer Pricing Rules Keep Step with International
Developments, 97 TNI 183-18, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File (noting Canada's reliance on the 1979
OECD report).
62. See 1979 OECD report, supra note 61 (endorsing the arm's length principle and rejecting any
apportionment formula).
63. See generally Robert G. Clark, Comment, TransferPricing, Section 482, and International Tax Conflict:
Getting Harmonized IncomeAllocation Measuresfrom Multinational Cacophony, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 1168-76
(1993) (discussing the transfer pricing methodology embodied in the 1979 OECD report and used by the OECD
members).
64. See Department of Finance, Information Circular 87-2 International Transfer Pricing and Other
International Transactions (Feb. 27, 1987). Information Circular 87-2 incorporated many of the provisions in the
1979 OECD and reflected Revenue Canada's interpretation of § 69 of the Income Tax Act. Id. In 1997, Revenue
Canada revised this circular [now Information Circular 87-2R] to reflect the recent developments in Canada's
transfer pricing laws. Id.
65. See Press Release 97-076, supra note 11.
66. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Transfer Pricing and Multinational
Enterprises: Three Taxation Issues, Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (Paris: OECD, 1984).
67. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2.
68. See id. at P4.
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mation Circular 87-2.69 In fact, Canada has never wavered from its reliance on the
OECD's transfer pricing work as the main mechanism for resolving transfer pricing
issues.
The Canadian government has recognized that in order for the 1995 OECD
report to have significance, the guidelines must represent the expression of an inter-
national consensus for allocating income and expenses.70 Canada has continuously
worked to build this international consensus as a means of promoting the goals of
the OECD and avoiding transfer pricing disputes.7 This is an important point
because without a multilateral approach for resolving transfer pricing issues
national tax administrations will continue to waste time and resources over inter-
national disagreements, and MNEs will continue to face the prospect of double
taxation. 2 Moreover, since no statute, regulation, circular, opinion or report can
provide an exhaustive discussion of transfer pricing, Canada's endorsement of the
OECD's transfer pricing work provides taxpayers with a practical guide to transfer
pricing issues. 3 Taxpayers, therefore, have an additional source for advice on how
to apply the arm's length principle. 4
With respect to Revenue Canada, the growth of MNEs presents increasingly
complex taxation issues because allocating intercompany cross-border transactions
are highly technical. 5 As tax authorities around the world acknowledge, intercom-
pany pricing questions do not lend themselves to one set of rules.76 Rather, inter-
company transfer pricing questions must be decided on a case-by-case basis.'
69. See Press Release 95-059. supra note 21 (stating the 1995 OECD report represents a consensus among
the OECD member countries and confirms Canada's administrative approach to transfer pricing).
70. See generally Schwinn, supra note 46 (quoting the director of Revenue Canada as saying "We're
[Canada] joining the international community [by enacting § 247 of the Income Tax Act].").
71. See Brian J. Arnold & Thomas E. McDonnell, Report on the Invitational Conference on Transfer
Pricing: The Allocation of Income and Expenses Among Countries, 41 CAN. TAXJ. 899 (1993).
72. See Owens, supra note 47, at 2054 (discussing the harmful effects of tax competition among countries).
73. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 4.2 (recognizing that without cooperation among tax
authorities the same item of income may be subject to more than one tax). Taxing the same income of a
multinational enterprise two or more times is an impediment to international trade because double or multiple
taxation is a disincentive for multinational enterprises to move goods and services across borders. Id. See generally
James R. Mogle, Competent Authority Procedure, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 725 (1990) (discussing
double taxation and how it can be abated through the competent authority process).
74. See generally 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at ch. I (discussing how associated enterprises and tax
authorities should interpret and apply the arm's length principle to intercompany cross-border transactions).
75. See Przysuski & Mikhail, supra note 54, at 937 (relating that transfer pricing audits can be very
complicated because they can involve large amounts of money, and the nature and scope of the audit can be
unlimited). Furthermore, the structure of a MNE can impede quick resolution because the corporate structure may
be highly integrated. Id. Added to this is the fact that the applicable Canadian tax law may also be difficult to apply
to a given situation. Id.
76. See Nathan Boidman, The Section 482 White Paper-A Canadian Perspective, 41 TAX EXECJrTIVE 285,
286 (1989) (noting transfer pricing questions are not easily reduced to a scientific and objective formula to be
applied uniformly between related parties).
77. See generally Salvador M. Borraccia, Selected Canadian Litigation Aspects of International Pricing
Disputes: Effect of Proposed Changes, 44 TAX EXECUTIVE 467 (Nov.-Dec. 1992) (discussing Canadian
administrative and judicial approach to solving transfer pricing disputes).
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To MNEs, the "facts and circumstances" 78 disposition of transfer pricing is
frustrating because large amounts of time and money is at stake.79 The lack of a
uniform multilateral tax structure often results in confusion, disagreement or
multiple taxation.80 Because transfer pricing laws differ from country to country,
MNEs are required to comply with different laws and administrative requirements
that a similarly situated enterprise operating solely within a single taxing juris-
diction can escape.8' When two countries disagree over income allocations
attributable to transfer pricing, a MNE can end up being double taxed because both
taxing authorities can make a transfer pricing adjustment to the cross-border
transaction.' 2 Few issues concern MNEs more than having the same income taxed
twice.83 However, the 1995 OECD report goes a long way towards addressing the
concerns of MNEs and tax authorities.84 Therefore, with Canada recognizing that
the significance of the 1995 OECD report rests in its role as an expression of an
international consensus, MNEs are one step closer to securing globally accepted
transfer pricing rules.85
B. The United States
If the OECD has made significant contributions to Canada's development of
transfer pricing laws, the United States has been the catalyst behind Canada's enact-
ment of those laws. 6 Ironically, the 1979 OECD report was inspired by the United
States' enactment of comprehensive pricing guidelines in 1968.87 The 1968 regu-
78. See Nathan Boidman, The Effect oftheAPA and Other U.S. Transfer-Pricing Initiatives In Canada and
Other Countries, 44 TAX EXECUTIVE 254,255 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. Transfer Pricing].
79. See Andrew H. Kingissepp, Strategies for Appealing Canadian Transfer Pricing Adjustments: Part I,
6 J. INT'LTAX'N 322,322 (1995) [hereinafter Kingissepp Part I] (asserting because litigation is costly in both time
and money, the usual approach for seeking relief is through the competent authority procedure when it is available).
80. See Ernst & Young, supra note 45, at H 77-117 (summarizing the transfer pricing laws of 12 different
countries).
81. See Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 7. at 193-94 (stating since taxation is based on the sovereignty of
nations, taxation of international transactions is often inconsistent and confusing).
82. See Clark, supra note 63, at 1157 (describing how MNEs may be taxed on the same income in two
countries on the same transaction).
83. See Ernst & Young, supra note 45, at 30 (finding that the single most important issue among
multinational enterprises is double taxation). While the survey found that 88% of the respondents consider double
tax relief to be the most important international tax issue, 52% said transfer pricing is the biggest international tax
issue they expect to face in the next two years. Id. In comparison, only 16% felt that double tax relief was the
biggest international tax issue they expect to face in the next two years. l at 32.
84. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at I4.29-4.31 (outlining the mutual agreement procedure).
85. See generally Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 7, at 228-29 (discussing the advantages of an international
tax system).
86. See Steiss & Blanchette, supra note 29, at 1568 (crediting the United States with being the prime
instigator for international unrest in the area of transfer pricing).
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482(1)-(2) (1994) (describing how the arm's length principle should be applied to
a specific fact pattern); see generally John S. Nolan, U.S. Final Transfer Pricing Regulations, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
537,538-46 (1996) (describing Treas. Reg. § 1.481-1).
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lations marked a turning point in the debate over intercompany cross-border
transactions because for the first time an attempt had been made to establish a
detailed set of transfer pricing rules. 8 Since this time, the United States, with
Canada in tow, has led the charge against MNEs to ensure MNEs properly allocate
their income and expenses among the countries where they carry on business.89 At
times, however, the United States' aggressive stance against MNEs has had some
fallout in Canada.90 For example, in 1992 the United States proposed com-
prehensive transfer pricing regulations interpreting the "commensurate with
income" phrase in section 482.91 These regulations were issued in response to a
1988 Treasury Department White Paper suggesting that the "super-royalty"
provision, added to section 482 in 1986, did not depart from the arm's length
standard.92 In the eyes of Revenue Canada, these regulations, as originally drafted,
were a retreat from the internationally recognized arm's length principle because
the regulations downgraded the traditional transaction methods 93 and accentuated
the transactional profit methods.94 Revenue Canada perceived the discounting of the
traditional transaction methods as a departure from the arm's length principle and
an obstacle for granting competent authority relief.95 Although the final regulations,
issued in July 1994, tempered much of the earlier criticism, Revenue Canada took
the unprecedented step of publicly announcing their opposition to the regulations.96
While the stepped-up enforcement efforts by the United States to protect its
domestic tax base against transfer pricing abuses appears to be working, Canada in
recent years has become increasingly concerned that these efforts may be causing
United States based MNEs operating in Canada to over-report their Canadian
income in the United States to avoid the imposition of a penalty by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). 97 Currently, the IRS can impose stiff transfer pricing
88. See Steiss & Blanchette, supra note 29, at 1572.
89. See generally Connolly, supra note 53, at 340 (asserting the United States has led the attack on
multinational enterprises that fail to satisfy the arm's length principle).
90. See Boidman, supra note 76, at 286 (stating the Canadian government worries the enactment of the
"super royalty" provision will lead to U.S. companies over charging Canadian companies); U.S. Transfer Pricing,
supra note 78, at 254 (asserting the Internal Revenue Service's use of Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs) has
prompted Revenue Canada to test the procedure).
91. SeeTreas. Reg.§ 1.482(1994).
92. UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING UNDER SECTION 482
OFTHE CODE (reprinted in Notice 88123, 1988-2 C.B. 458 (1988)).
93. See discussion infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the traditional transaction methods).
94. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2 (discussing the transactional profit methods); Mary C. Bennett et
al., First U.S.-Ukraine Treaty; Canada Clarifies Transfer Pricing; Mexico Awaits Approval, 5 J. INT'LTAX'N 280,
282-83 (1994) (stating Canada finds the § 482 regulations unacceptable because they give the comparable profit
methods a prominent role).
95. See Steiss & Blanchette, supra note 29, at 1594.
96. See Department of Finance Canada, Immediate Release, Transfer Pricing Rules and Guidelines
Clarified, 94-003 (Ottawa: Jan. 7, 1994).
97. See Albertina M. Fernandez, Tax Notes International: The Week in Review, 15 TAX NOTES INT'L 1583
(Nov. 17, 1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
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penalties on MNEs that under-report their income or fail to document their transfer
pricing transactions. 98 While it remains unclear whether the IRS's stepped up efforts
have significantly intimidated MNEs into over-reporting their Canadian income in
the United States to avoid these stiff penalties, what is clear is that section 247 is,
in part, Canada's response to what it perceives as the United States supplementing
its treasury at the expense of the Canadian treasury.9 Perhaps in a show of courtesy,
however, Revenue Canada, at least publicly, contends that section 247 is in
response to Canada's growth in international trade and the corresponding growth
in intercompany cross-border transactions.100
C. An International Trend
Since the release of the 1995 OECD report several countries have taken the
opportunity to update their transfer pricing laws. t' t Among the countries that have
most recently updated their transfer pricing laws are Australia, t12 Mexico,0 3 New
Zealand,"14 Great Britain, 0 5 Brazil1 6 and Korea."t1 With many of these countries
looking for new ways to increase revenues and reduce national deficits, targeting
98. See I.R.C. § 6662 (1997).
99. See Alan Shapiro & Bill Dodge, Three Downs and Out: New Canadian Transfer Pricing Rules Level
the Playing Field, 97 TAX NOTES INT'L 221-20 (Nov. 17, 1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
100. See generally Schwinn, supra note 46 (stating Revenue Canada considers the new transfer pricing laws
as necessary to accommodate Canada's growth in international trade and the growth in intercompany cross-border
transactions); Courtney Tower, New Canadian Tax Rules Aiming at Foreign Firms: More Documentation is
Required for any Transfer-Pricing Practices, J. OF COMMERCE, Sept. 16, 1997, Finance at 2A (saying the new
transfer pricing laws are to protect the Canadian tax base from transfer pricing abuses).
101. See Ernst & Young, supra note 45, at j 4 (relating many countries are developing formal transfer pricing
documentation requirements and penalties to protect their own tax bases).
102. See Vikas Khanna, Australia Widens its Anti-Tax-Haven and Foreign Income Tax, 97 TAX NOTES INT'L
245-1 (Dec. 22, 1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File (describing the recent changes in Australia's
controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation and foreign-source income rules); see generally Ernst & Young,
supra note 45, at 178-81(providing a brief summary of Australia's transfer pricing laws).
103. See Albertina Fernandez, Mexico's Maquiladora Transfer Pricing Safe Harbor to be Eliminated for
1999, 97 TAX NOTES IT'L 185-17 (Sept. 24, 1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File (discussing
Mexico's transfer pricing safe harbor for maquiladoras).
104. See Andra Glyn-Jones, New Zealand Releases Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 97 TAX NOTES INT'L 209-
18, (Oct. 18, 1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File 97 TN1 209-18 (discussing the release of New
Zealand's new transfer pricing guideline).
105. See Regulation Extends Its Reach, THE FNANCIAL TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1997, at 10 (providing a brief
overview of some of Canada's transfer pricing provisions); Anne O'Connell Devereaux, Inland Revenue Official
Summarizes U.K. Transfer Pricing Consultative Document, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 209-15 (Oct. 29, 1997),
available in LEXIS, Taxana Library TNT File; see generally Ernst & Young, supra note 45, at [ 111-14
(summarizing the United Kingdom's transfer pricing laws).
106. See Eduardo F Goldszal & Lawrence Olson, Highlights of Brazil's New Transfer Pricing Regulation,
97 TAX NOTES INT'L 101-2 (May 27, 1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
107. See Kyung Geun Lee et al., Korea Announces New Law on Coordination of International Tax Matters,
96 TAX NOTES INT'L 38-4 (Feb. 26, 1996), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File; see generally Ernst &
Young, supra note 45, at [ 98-100 (overviewing Korea's transfer pricing laws).
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MNEs is politically much easier than domestic-based companies.! 8 A major focus
of this heightened scrutiny by tax authorities is to increase international audits
because transfer pricing investigations yield a high ratio of tax to costs when
compared with other forms of international tax investigative work 3 9 To help inter-
national tax auditors make transfer pricing adjustments, most of the laws introduced
increase or establish penalties for under reporting income and require MNEs to
document their transfer pricing practices 10 New Zealand, for example, released a
comprehensive transfer pricing guideline based on the 1995 OECD report that
outlines how Inland Revenue interprets the arm's length principle, pricing methods,
and what kind of documents taxpayers are expected to prepare to justify their
transfer pricing position.' Not surprisingly, Inland Revenue's documentation
requirements mirror the requirements contained in section 247(4).112 The enactment
of section 247 and the revision of Information Circular 87-2, therefore, suggests that
Canada is making good its commitment to join the international community."3
IV. SECTION 247 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT
Section 247 contains three principle subsections that apply to transactions
between a Canadian taxpayer and a nonresident person.1 4 First, under subsection
247(2), Revenue Canada is given the authority to adjust or recharacterize
transactions it believes do not adhere to the arm's length principle or would not
108. See generally Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 7, at 196 (discussing how nations use tax policy to support
their goals).
109. See generally Regulation Extends Its Reach, supra note 105 (noting that while the political rhetoric
claiming that billions of dollars are lost to transfer pricing abuses is unsubstantiated, transfer pricing audits do
produce larger returns than cost).
110. See id. (stating that Canada, Australia and Spain have updated their transfer pricing laws to give their
tax authorities a tough new weapon to combat transfer pricing abuses).
111. See INLAND REVENUE, TRANSFER PRICING DRAFT GUIDELINES: A GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF
SECTION GD 13 OFNEWZEALAND'S INcOMETAX ACTOp 1994, IRD TAX INFORMATION BULLETIN: VOL. 9, No. 10
(Oct. 1997) Appendix 99 259-369. Currently, no statutory requirement exists in New Zealand that taxpayers prepare
and maintain transfer pricing documentation. Id. However, Inland Revenue clearly believes that it is in the best
interest of a taxpayer to adequately document their transfer pricing transactions in accordance with the new
guidelines and the 1995 OECD report. Id. This is sage advice considering that if Inland Revenue makes a transfer
pricing adjustment it will evaluate the taxpayer's documentation as a factor in determining whether to assess a
penalty. Id.
112. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(a)(l)-(vi) (1998) (Can.).
113. See generally Schwinn, supra note 46 (quoting the director of Revenue Canada as stating that § 247 is
Canada's means of "joining the international community" with respect to transfer pricing rules).
114. Section 247 contains eleven subsections relating to transfer pricing. The three principle subsections
relate to the arm's length principle, a penalty and the contemporaneous documentation requirements. See Income
Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2) (1998) (Can.) (relating to the arm's length principle); Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(3)
(1998) (Can.) (pertaining to the transfer pricing penalty); Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4) (1998) (Can.)
(describing the contemporaneous documentation requirements).
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have been entered into by arm's length parties except to obtain a "tax benefit....5
This provision will apply to all transactions between related parties. 16 Following
the adjustment and recharacterization provision is a ten percent penalty provision
that will apply to Canadian taxpayers that fail to make reasonable efforts to practice
arm's length pricing.1 7 In the event a taxpayer fails to satisfy the documentation
requirements in subsection 247(4), the last major subsection, the taxpayer is deemed
to not have made reasonable efforts to satisfy the penalty provision.' l
A. The Arm's Length Principle
Prior to the enactment of section 247(2), the arm's length principle was con-
tained in the simply worded provisions of subsections 69(2) and 69(3).119 As
embodied in these two subsections, the arm's length principle required that the
cross-border transactions between related or associated persons be the same as
prices in similar transactions between parties that are not related.1 20 This definition
was patterned on the internationally recognized authoritative statement of the arm's
length principle contained in paragraph 1, of article 9, of the OECD model treaty.2
Canada's incorporation of the arm's length principle contained in the OECD model
treaty, which is founded upon the separate entity approach, 22 is based on the
soundness of this principle and the fact that it provides taxation authorities with the
best approximation of the workings of the open market when goods and services are
shipped across international borders between related parties."2 More important,
Revenue Canada has found the arm's length principle to be workable and produce
results that are acceptable, even though the transfer pricing methods may not always
apply in a straightforward manner.' 24
While section 247 replaces subsections 69(2) and 69(3), it does not funda-
mentally change Canada's position with respect to the dominate role that the arm's
115. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2)(a)-(b) (1998) (Can.). A "tax benefit" is defined in § 247(1) to
mean "a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount payable under this Act or an increase in a refund
of tax or other amount under this Act."
116. See id. §§ 247(2) and 247(6).
117. See id. § 247(3). See generally Shapiro & Dodge, supra note 99 (stating the new Canadian penalty is
potentially much more severe than the U.S. penalty because the Canadian penalty applies to the whole transfer
pricing adjustment and not just the additional tax imposed like the U.S. penalty).
118. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(3) (1998) (Can.).
119. See Income Tax Act § 69(2)-(3) (1985) (Can.) (repealed).
120. See id. § 69.
121. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on
Capital, 1 1 Article 9, Committee on Fiscal Affairs Report (Paris: OECD 1977) (loose leaf).
122. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1.6 (noting because the arm's length principle seeks to
replicate the terms and conditions of transactions between associated enterprises and independent enterprises, the
members of a MNE must be treated as independent entities for such comparisons to be useful).
123. Id. at 1.13.
124. See generally TM II, supra note 19 (asserting that applying the transfer pricing methods is not an exact
science).
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length principle has played in the evaluation of international transfer pricing.'15 The
arm's length principle remains the foundation of Canada's transfer pricing
scheme."2 However, subsection 247(2) expands the arm's length principle to im-
prove compliance for associated enterprises that enter into arm's length transactions
for purely tax purposes. 27 Giving Revenue Canada the power to disregard and
restructure an arm's length transaction entered into for purely tax purposes goes
beyond the arm's length principle contemplated in the 1995 OECD report because
restructuring a legitimate business transaction is an arbitrary exercise. 128 Never-
theless, because Canada's new transfer pricing rules are based on individual
transactions, and specific methods for determining whether those transactions meet
the arm's length standard, MNEs will find the new rules a difference in degree and
not a difference in kind from Canada's old transfer pricing rules.129 However, one
change that MNEs will find different is the power granted to Revenue Canada to
recharacterize transactions. 30
1. Adjustment and Recharacterization
As already stated, subsection 247(2) embodies the arm's length principle.1
3 '
This subsection gives Revenue Canada the authority to adjust both the quantum and
the nature of amounts in two situations. First, where transactions between related
parties do no reflect the terms and conditions that would have arisen between
persons dealing at arm's length, Revenue Canada is given the authority to make
transfer pricing adjustments to reflect those amounts that would have been deter-
mined had the transactions been carried out between arm's length persons. 32 Put
another way, if the terms and conditions of cross-border transactions between
related parties are found to differ from those that would have been found between
independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances,
Revenue Canada can adjust the associated enterprise's tax liabilities.' 33 While this
provision may at first glance appear more onerous than the previous provision,
which stated that the transfer prices be "reasonable in the circumstances," 4 this
125. See Press Release 97-076, supra note I1 (stating the arm's length principle remains in tact).
126. See generally Wilkie, supra note 61 (noting that the thrust behind § 247 is to preserve Canada's
substantial adherence to the arm's length principle).
127. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2)(b)(l)-(ii) (1998) (Can.).
128. See id § 247(2). It will be up to Revenue Canada to determine whether a transaction entered into by an
associated enterprise would not have been entered into by persons dealing at arm's length, and whether the sole
reason for entering into the transaction was to obtain a tax benefit. Id.
129. See generally Wilkie, supra note 61 (describing Canada's new transfer pricing rules as evolutionary
rather than revolutionary).
130. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2)(b) (1998) (Can.).
131. Id. § 247(2).
132. Id. § 247(2)(a).
133. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 14.
134. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. § 69 (1985) (Can.).
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new provision will not fundamentally change the way Revenue Canada has applied
the arm's length principle. 35 In fact, this provision is the quintessential inter-
pretation of the arm's length standard recognized by OECD member countries.
136
Much more controversial is the second rule in subsection 247(2) that gives
Revenue Canada the authority to recharacterize or disregard transactionsthat would
not have been entered into between persons dealing at arm's length. 37 In the draft
legislation, Revenue Canada was given broad power to ignore or recharacterize any
transactions, which in its view, would not have been entered into between persons
dealing at arm's length.33 This powerful tool for attacking transfer pricing trans-
actions was too much for the tax community to endure because it vested Revenue
Canada with too much power.139 After receiving significant criticism from the tax
community, the Department of Finance revised this provision and narrowed the
power to recharacterize the nature of a transaction.' Now for a transaction to be
recharacterized, it must be shown that the transaction entered into would not have
been entered into between persons dealing at arm's length, and that the transaction
can reasonably be considered not to have been entered into primarily for bona fide
purposes other than to obtain a tax benefit. 141
It follows from the foregoing that where an associated enterprise enters into a
transaction that would not normally be entered into between independent enter-
prises, the transaction will not be recharacterized where the primary purpose of the
transaction is not to obtain a tax benefit. 42 Therefore, associated enterprises need
to structure their transactions in a business fashion regardless of their intent.'
43
However, if the non-arm's length parties are not careful, the transaction may still
be subject to a transfer pricing adjustment in the event the transaction does not
reflect the terms and conditions that would have arisen between persons dealing at
arm's length.44 Because transfer pricing adjustments can be costly, it would be wise
135. See generally Wilkie, supra note 61 (asserting the arm's length principle will remain central to Revenue
Canada's evaluation of international transfer pricing).
136. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1.2-1.3 (defining how OECD member countries interpret
the arm's length principle).
137. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2)(b) (1998) (Can.).
138. DepartmentofFinanceCanada, Draft Legislation ofTransferPricing, Sept. 11,1997, §247(2)(b) (giving
Revenue Canada the power to recharacterize a transaction that would not have been entered into between persons
dealing at arm's length).
139. See Francois Vincent, Canadian Transfer Pricing: Finance Makes Changes But Cedes Little Ground,
97 TAX NOTES INT'L 250-10, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
140. Compare Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2)(b) (1998) (Can.), with Department of Finance, supra note
138. Subparagraph § 247(2)(b)(ii) was added to the final legislation to narrow the power of Revenue Canada to
recharacterize transactions.
141. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2)(b) (1998) (Can.).
142. See id. § 247(2)(b)(ii).
143. See generally Vincent, supra note 139 (noting that transactions with a bona fide business purpose should
not be subject to recharacterization by the Canadian tax authorities).
144. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2)(a) (1998) (Can.).
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for tax practitioners to carefully evaluate each transaction or series of transactions
separately to ensure the arm's length principle is satisfied. 45
Tax practitioners will need to consult Information Circular 87-2R and the 1995
OECD report to understand what terms and conditions will be considered at arm's
length.' 46 Because Information Circular 87-2R simply lists the factors determining
comparability, and does not elaborate on criteria to be used to establish whether a
transaction would not have been entered into between persons dealing at arm's
length, it would be wise for tax practitioners to consult Chapter 1 of the 1995
OECD report.' 47 Chapter 1 of the OECD report establishes the guidelines for
applying the ann's length principle and discusses the attributes of the transactions
or enterprises that affect conditions in ann's length dealings. 48 As recognized in
Information Circular 87-2R, the attributes that must be considered are the functions
performed by the parties, the economic circumstances of the parties, business
strategies, the property or services transferred and the contractual terms of a
transaction.
149
2. At the Minister's Discretion
Another interesting feature of the new rules relating to adjustments is contained
in subsection 247(10).150 Under this subsection, Revenue Canada is given the
discretion not to impose transfer pricing adjustments that would result in a decrease
in a taxpayer's taxable income.'' This gives the Minster a great deal of latitude
because he has the option to only positively adjust a taxpayer's income.'52 While
this provision may be unfortunate for Canadian taxpayers that over-report their
transfer pricing income, it is consistent with Canada's old transfer pricing laws and
the "associated enterprises" articles of Canadian tax treaties. 53 Nevertheless,
145. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 17.
146. Id. at 115 (directing taxpayers to reviewing paragraphs 1.19 through 1.35 of the 1995 OECD report to
determine the factors that may influence the degree of comparability of transactions).
147. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1 1.1-1.70.
148. Id. at l 1.19-1.35.
149. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19 J 15-17; see also 1995 OECD report, supra note
2, at f 1.19-1.35 (outlining the factors OECD member countries should use for determining comparability between
controlled and uncontrolled transactions).
150. See generally Wilkie, supra note 61 (discussing § 247(10) as provided in the draft legislation issued on
Sept. 11, 1997).
151. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(10) (1998) (Can.) (stating "[a]n adjustment (other than an adjustment
that results in or increases a transfer pricing capital adjustment or a transfer pricing income adjustment of a taxpayer
for a taxation year) shall be not be made under [§ 247(2)] unless, in the opinion of the Minister, the circumstances
are such that it would be appropriate that the adjustment be made").
152. See generally Vincent, supra note 139 (describingunderwhat circumstances the Canadian tax authorities
can recharacterize a transfer pricing transaction).
153. See generally Wilkie, supra note 61 (stating the discretion accorded the Minister in § 247(10) is unjust
with respect to the primary income tax computation).
1998 / Canada's Transfer Pricing Laws
allowing Revenue Canada the unfettered discretion not to make a downward
adjustment to a taxpayer's taxable income has broad implications for taxpayers.1 54
To illustrate the inequity section 247(10) poses to taxpayers, assume two
associated enterprises, one in Canada and the other in Australian, undertake a
transaction by which the Australian company charges the Canadian company a
transfer price that is less than a comparable transaction undertaken between
independent enterprises. In this situation, because an upward adjustment would
decrease the Canadian company's income, Revenue Canada, under section 247(10),
has the option not to make the adjustment.'55 Since granting an upward adjustment
is wholly within the discretion of Revenue Canada, the overpayment will be con-
sidered part of the Canadian company's income and may be subject to penalty.
56
However, in a show of compassion, Revenue Canada is willing to consider yielding
its discretion under section 247(10) should the Australian tax authorities make a
downward adjustment in the Australian company's transfer pricing, and the
Canadian company seeks relief under the competent authority procedure.
57
B. Arm's Length Methods
Although subsection 247(2) endorses the arm's length principle, it leaves to
Information Circular 87-2R the task of elaborating what Revenue Canada's position
is with respect to interpreting and applying the arm's length principle.'58 Since
Revenue Canada holds that the best way of determining whether the arm's length
principle is satisfied is to compare the prices charged in a controlled transaction
with prices charged in a comparable transaction between two unrelated parties,
Canadian taxpayers are forced to evaluate all the information they have available
and compare that information with each transfer pricing method to determine which
method produces the most reliable measure of the arm's length principle.159 Only
if the transfer pricing method used by the taxpayer produces the most reliable
measure of the arm's length principle will Revenue Canada be under any obligation
to accept the outcome. 160 However, once a taxpayer selects a particular method that
provides the highest degree of comparability between transactions, the taxpayer is
relieved from having to make determinations under a lower-ranking method.'
6t
154. Id.
155. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2) (1998) (Can.).
156. Id. § 247(3).
157. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19. at 96 (stating that one circumstance where the
Minister may find it appropriate to exercise his discretion to make a downward adjustment is where a taxpayer is
entitled to request or has requested relief from double taxation under the mutual agreements procedures of a tax
treaty).
158. See id. at 1 22 (describing the acceptable transfer pricing methods endorsed by Revenue Canada).
159. Id. at 23.
160. Id. at [27.
161. Id. at 26.
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Information Circular 87-2R makes clear that the acceptable transfer pricing
methods' 62 for determining an arm's length price or allocation are those outlined in
the 1995 OECD report. 163 Although the discussion of the transfer pricing methods
in the circular is relatively brief, and is intended to merely summarize the 1995
OECD report's discussion of transfer pricing methods, the circular strongly recom-
mends that taxpayers choose the transfer pricing method that provides the highest
degree of comparability that is appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the
transaction. ' 4 Since finding transactions between independent enterprises that are
similar enough to the controlled transaction may be difficult for associated
enterprises, the circular accepts all five of the OECD's transfer pricing methods.' 65
However, tax practitioners should be cautioned that the circular, like the 1995
OECD report, expresses a clear preference for the traditional transactional
methods' 6€ over the transaction profit methods.
167
1. Traditional Transaction Methods
Information Circular 87-2R endorses three traditional transaction methods that
associated enterprises can employ to determine whether the terms and conditions
of a controlled transaction are comparable between similar transaction undertaken
by independent enterprises. 68 The OECD also endorses these three methods and
they are the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale method (RSM)
and the cost plus method (CPM).169 Of these three transfer pricing methods,
Revenue Canada accepts the CUP method as the most direct approach for
162. See generally Wilkie, supra note 61 (recognizing transfer pricing methods as tools for determining
whether the conditions imposed in the commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises are
consistent with the arm's length principle).
163. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 1 21 (explaining that Revenue Canada relies
on the transfer pricing methods in the 1995 OECD report).
164. Id. at 25 (stating that the CUP method provides the highest degree of comparability).
165. Id. at [22.
166. Id. at Uj 28-36; see also 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at ch. 2 (explaining the three traditional
transaction methods: (1) the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), (2) the resale price method (RPM) and
(3) the cost plus method (CPM)). The traditional transaction methods seek to compare the prices charged in
controlled transactions among associated enterprises with prices charged in comparable transactions between
independent enterprises. Id.
167. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at U 37-46 (discussing the profit split methods);
see also 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at ch. 3 (explaining that there are two transaction profit methods: (1) the
profit split method (PSM), and (2) the transactional net margin method (TNMM)). The transactional profit methods
seek to compare the profits that arise from controlled transactions among associated enterprises with profits that
arise in comparable transactions between independent enterprises. Id.
168. Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at I 22(a).
169. See generally 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, atc h. 2 (discussing the traditional transaction methods).
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determining whether a transaction between associated enterprises adheres to the
arm's length principle.
170
a. The Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method
The CUP method simply compares the prices charged for services or property
transferred between associated enterprises with prices charged for services or pro-
perty transferred between independent enterprises. 17' In any tax system that adheres
to the arm's length principle, this is the preferred method for making transfer
pricing adjustments because this method focuses on the product being transferred.
172
Since the CUP method is concerned with the price of the product being transferred,
any difference in prices between transactions undertaken by associated and indepen-
dent enterprises indicates that the terms and conditions of the transaction
undertaken between the associated enterprises will need to be adjusted to reflect the
terms and conditions of the transaction undertaken between the independent enter-
prises."
In theory, comparing transactions between associated and independent enter-
prises is easy.' 74 In practice, however, finding uncontrolled transactions that are
similar enough to make meaningful comparisons is difficult. 7 5 For example, small
differences in the quality of the goods transferred between controlled and
uncontrolled transactions can upset the price being charged.176 However, even
where comparables do not exist, Revenue Canada can still make a transfer pricing
adjustment under the CUP method. Information Circular 87-2R incorporates the
1995 OECD report's recommendations that, even without strict comparables, a
transfer pricing adjustment using the CUP method is applicable where a reasonably
accurate adjustment can be made to eliminate the differences between the controlled
170. Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 1 25; see also Indalex v. The Queen [1986] 86
D.T.C. 6039, 6047-48 (accepting the theory of comparables, but finding no comparables existed); see generally
Boidman, Indalex v. The Queen, supra note 44, at 245-46 (discussing the Indalex Court's treatment of
comparables).
171. 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 2.6.
172. See Frances M. Homer, International Cooperation and Understanding: What's NewAbout the OECD's
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 1065, 1077 (1996); see also George N. Carlson et al., The US.
Final Transfer Pricing Regulations: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L
333, 336 (1994) (stating the comparable uncontrolled price method is recognized to yield the most reliable results
if sufficient data are available).
173. See John E. O'Grady, An Overview of the New Temporary Transfer Pricing Regulations, 6 TAX NOTES
INT'L 211, 218-19 (1994) (discussing the CUP method under the 1993 temporary transfer pricing laws of the Unites
States).
174. See Carlson et al., supra note 172, at 335.
175. See Indalex v. The Queen [1986] 86 D.T.C. 6039,6048 (determining a transaction was not comparable
where a third party purchased a third of the volume purchased by Alcan).
176. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 2.8 (noting that it is difficult to find transactions between
independent enterprises that are similar enough to controlled transactions such that no differences have a material
effect on price).
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and uncontrolled transactions. 7 7 Therefore, when establishing a transfer price, tax
practitioners must be especially careful when comparing goods or services being
transferred between non-arm's length parties.' Nonetheless, since comparable
transactions are not always available, Revenue Canada adopts the RSM and CPM.
79
b. Resale and Cost Plus Methods
The RSM and CPM operate in the same manner as the CUP method. 80 The
difference is that the RSM and CPM focus on the gross margins from controlled and
uncontrolled transactions to determine whether the terms and conditions between
associated enterprises meet the arm's length principle.'' For example, the RPM
focuses on the price at which a product purchased between related parties is resold
to an independent enterprise. 82 This resell price is then reduced by an appropriate
gross margin (resale price margin). 3 The resale price margin is determined by
adding together the amounts the reseller would seek to cover its selling and other
operating expenses, and in light of the functions performed, make an appropriate
profit.18 4 The remainder, after subtracting the gross margin, is an arm's length price
for the original transaction between the associated enterprises. 8 5 In other words, the
RPM tries to determine what amount from the resell price is required to fully com-
pensate the reseller for the services performed.8 6 What is left is the arm's length
transfer price."8 7
Similarly, the CPM is achieved by focusing on the costs incurred by the
supplier of property or services in a controlled transaction'8 Using this method, an
177. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R. supra note 19, at 30 (stating transactions may serve as
comparable where the differences can be measured on a reasonable basis and an appropriate adjustment can be
made to eliminate the effects of those differences).
178. See generally Menyasz & Hirani, supra note 59 (noting that U.S. companies need to be careful in their
transfer pricing planning and defense in light of § 247).
179. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 22 (listing the two groups of transfer pricing
methods accepted by Revenue Canada).
180. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 2.14 and 2.32 (noting the RPM and the CPM seek to compare
the prices charged in controlled transactions with uncontrolled transactions).
181. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "gross margin" as the difference between
the amount of sales after returns, allowances, and the cost of goods sold).
182. See Marc M. Levey & Lawrence W. Shapiro, OECD Transfer Pricing Avoids Overpapering the Best
Method, 6 J. INT'LTAX'N 52,55-56 (1995) (discussing how the RSM is most useful when it is applied to marketing
operations).
183. See Diane Hay et al., Past and Present Work in the OECD on Transfer Pricing and Selected Issues, 9
TAX NOTES INT'L 249,258 (1994).
184. 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 2.14 (describing how OECD member countries should calculate
the RSM).
185. Id.
186. See INLAND REVENUE, supra note 111, at [79 (discussing the RSM from the economics approach).
187. Id.
188. 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 2.32 (explaining how the CPM should be applied by OECD
member countries).
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appropriate gross margin (cost plus markup) is added to the costs incurred by the
supplier in a controlled transaction.'8 9 To put it differently, the CPM seeks to
determine what amount over the supplier's cost needs to be added to the product to
give the supplier an appropriate profit in light of the functions performed and the
market conditions.'9
Accordingly, the same approach for determining comparability using the CUP
method is used for determining the RPM and the CPM.' 9' This means the resell
price margin or cost plus markup in an uncontrolled transaction needs to be com-
parable to a controlled transaction. 92 An uncontrolled transaction is comparable to
a controlled transaction if one of two requirements is met. The first condition is that
there must be no difference between the transactions being compared or between
the enterprises undertaking those transactions that could materially affect the price,
the resale price margin or the cost plus markup in the open market with respect to
the particular method being employed. 93 Second, if there are material defects,
reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of
such differences.'94 However, with respect to the RPM, comparability can be
determined by comparing the resale price margin that the same seller earns on items
purchased and sold in comparable uncontrolled transactions. 195 Similarly, com-
parability can be established by reference to the cost plus markup that the same
supplier earns in comparable uncontrolled transactions.
9 6
To illustrate how Revenue Canada will apply the RPM and CPM, assume
Company A, which is in Canada, purchases product X for C$1,000 from related
Company B, which is in Mexico. Company B manufactured product X for C$850,
and company A sold product X to Company C, an independent enterprise in
Canada, for C$1,400. Additionally, assume company A sold a product comparable
to product X to company D, also an independent enterprise in Canadian, where the
resell price margin was C$250. Finally, assume two independent enterprises,
company E, located in Canada, and company F, located in the U.S., entered into a
transaction comparable to the transaction between A and B where the cost plus
markup is C$300.
Applying the above facts using the RPM, the arm's length price between
Company A and B is C$1,150. Since there is a comparable uncontrolled transaction
189. See Hay et al., supra note 183, at 258.
190. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 131 (stating how Revenue Canada will apply
the CPM to a individual cross-border intercompany transaction).
191. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at TI 1.15-1.35 (discussing the five factors for determining
comparability). The five factors for determining comparability are: the characteristics of the property or services;
functional analysis; contractual terms; economic circumstances; and business strategies. Id.
192. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at T 33 and 35.
193. 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 9T 2.7, 2.16, 2.34 and 1.15-1.35.
194. Id. at [ 2.7, 2.16 and 2.34.
195. Id at 2.15.
196. Id. at 12.33.
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where the resell price margin is C$250, the arm's length price is easy to calculate
because all that must be done is subtract the comparable resell price margin
(C$250) from the resell price (C$1,400). 19"
Just as easy to determine is the arm's length price using CPM. Using the same
facts with the CPM, the arm's length price between company A and B is also
C$1,150. This amount is reached by adding the cost incurred by the supplier
(C$850) and the comparable cost plus markup between companies E and F
(C$300). t98 Ideally, however, the cost plus markup should be determined by
comparing the cost plus markup the supplier earns in controlled transactions with
what the supplier earns in comparable uncontrolled transactions. 199
Obviously, one drawback to prioritizing the transfer pricing methods is where
a taxpayer is unable to use the comparable uncontrolled price method. In this
situation, the taxpayer must select at least the cost plus method and the resale price
method and determine which one of these methods provides the highest degree of
comparability because neither the 1995 OECD report nor Information Circular 87-
2R prefers one method over the other.200 This is an important point to remember
because if a taxpayer only prepares documentation for the cost plus method, and
Revenue Canada later determines that the resale price method is more reflective of
the arm's length principle, the taxpayer will be deemed not to have made reasonable
efforts in determining an arm's length price. 0'
2. Transactional Profit Methods
There are two transactional profit methods endorsed by Information Circular
87-2R and the 1995 OECD report. 202 These two methods are the profit split method
(PSM) and the transactional net margin method (TNMM).2 3 In contrast to the
traditional transaction methods that rely on comparability of prices, the PSM and
TNMM examine the profits that arise from controlled transactions. 2 4 Under the
PSM and TNMM, the profits arising from controlled transactions are then compared
with profits that would have been made by independent enterprises in comparable
197. See generally Shapiro & Dodge, supra note 99 (comparing the approach the United States and Canada
take with respect to the resale price method).
198. Id. (discussing the approaches the United States and Canada take with respect to the cost plus method).
199. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 2.33 (discussing the two ways the cost plus mark up can be
established).
200. See generally Levey & Shapiro, supra note 182, at 54-56 (stating although the RPM and CPM have
equal stature, the 1995 OECD report does not prefer one method over the other).
201. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4) (1998) (Can.).
202. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at I 22(b) (listing the two transactional profit
methods that are acceptable to Revenue Canada).
203. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 182, at 56 (referring to the profit split method and transactional net
margin method as the "other methods").
204. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1 3.2 (discussing the two transactional profit methods).
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circumstances. 2 5 Information Circular 87-2R indicates Revenue Canada's
reluctance to accept the PSM and TNMM.2° However, where a taxpayer relies on
one of the transactional profit methods, the circular prefers the PSM to the
TNMM.207 In all transfer pricing cases, therefore, Revenue Canada considers the
TNMM as the method of last resort.08 Nevertheless, both profit methods are sub-
ordinate to all three of the traditional transaction methods, and should be used only
in exceptional cases.7 An exceptional case exists where the practical difficulties
of a business situation cause the traditional transaction methods to become
unreliable or impossible to apply.
210
a. Profit Split Method
Under the PSM, associated enterprises seek to achieve the same profits indepen-
dent enterprises would have expected to receive from a comparable transaction. t t
This method is useful when transactions between associated enterprises are very
interrelated and cannot be assessed on a separate basis.12 As applied, the PSM
identifies and splits profits among associated enterprises based on what would have
been anticipated and reflected in an agreement made at arm's length.213 Since
entering into transactions where profit is a condition in the transaction is unusual
for independent enterprises, the contribution of each associated enterprise is heavily
dependent upon a detailed analysis of the functions performed.2 4 Ordinarily, the
profits to be combined will be the operating profits.2 5
Once the profits to be split among associated enterprises are identified, Infor-
mation Circular 87-2R prefers a residual analysis over a contribution analysis or any
other method for determining the division of profits.216 A residual analysis is
achieved by first allocating to each associated enterprise a basic return appropriate
for the functions undertaken in the transaction.21 7 This amount is reached by
205. ld.
206. Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 123 (noting the transactional profit methods should
only be used as methods of last resort).
207. Ma at 24.
208. Id. (stating Revenue Canada considers the TNMM as the method that should be used only when all the
other transfer pricing methods are inapplicable).
209. See generally Wilkie, supra note 61 (noting Revenue Canada will first try to determine whether a
traditional transaction method will satisfy the arm's length principle).
210. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 3.1.
211. Id. at 3.2.
212. See Draft Infonmatian Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 37 (noting the PSM may be applied where
the operations of two or more associated enterprises are highly integrated).
213. See generally Levey & Shapiro, supra note 182, at 56-57 (discussing the PSM).
214. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 138 (explaining the first step in determining
the total profits earned by parties from their integrated operations).
215. Seeid at 37.
216. See id at140.
217. 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 3.19 (discussing how a residual analysis works).
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comparing the returns established from comparable transaction undertaken by inde-
pendent enterprises.1 8 After the basic return has been allocated, the second step
involves allocating the residual profits or losses between the associated enter-
prises.219 This allocation is reached by analyzing the facts and circumstances
surrounding the transaction to determine how the residual profits or losses would
have been divided between independent enterprises.22
b. The Transactional Net Margin Method
The TNMM is determined by comparing the net profit margin in a transaction
between associated enterprises with the net profit margin realized by independent
enterprises from similar transactions. 221 As with the PSM, a functional analysis is
required to determine whether controlled and uncontrolled transactions are com-
parable and what adjustments are necessary to obtain reliable results.222 However,
since the TNMM is applied to only one associated enterprise, it can produce absurd
results.2 Many factors unrelated to transfer prices can affect net margins.224 For
example, market share has a tremendous influence on a company's net profit
margin.22- Where one company enjoys a sizeable advantage over its competitors, its
transactions will be conducted in light of its competitive position. With respect to
its competitive position in the market, all of the differences are likely to have a
material effect on the profitability of the compared transactions.226
Because Revenue Canada takes the position that the TNMM should be used
only as a method of last resort,227 tax practitioners would be wise to establish their
transfer prices under one of the four methods mentioned above.228 By ordering the
transfer pricing methods, Canada is sending a message to MNEs that it will not
218. See Hay et al., supra note 183, at 26.
219. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 182, at 57 (explaining the two stages of a residual analysis).
220. 1995 OECD report. supra note 2, at 3.19.
221. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 1 41 (describing the TNMM and stating that
the TNMM is only to be considered by taxpayers when the other recommended methods cannot be used or do not
produce a reasonable estimate of an arm's length price or allocation).
222. See id. at 143-44 (discussing how Revenue Canada will apply the TNMM).
223. 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1 3.31 (noting since many factors unrelated to transfer prices can
affect net margins and can render the TNMM less reliable heightens the concerns over a one-sided analysis).
224. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 44 (recommending that taxpayers not rely
solely on broad sources of industry profit data to try to satisfy the standards of comparability required to implement
the TNMM).
225. See Hay et al., supra note 183, at 261.
226. See generally 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1.31-1.35 (discussing why business strategies need
to be considered in determining comparability for transfer pricing purposes).
227. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 24.
228. See Jack Bernstein, Canada-U.S. Transfers of Technology: A Canadian Perspective, 15 TAX NOTES
INT'L 1693, 1701 (1997) (stating that taxpayers should ideally apply the CUP method in the transfers of technology
between the U.S. and Canada).
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accept the "best method" approach to setting arm's length prices.229 Under the
current U.S. transfer pricing rules, MNEs are simply required to adopt the "best
method" that provides the most reliable measure of the arm's length principle.23° In
other words, the U.S. rules do not prioritize the methods but rather leave it up to the
taxpayer to choose the best method under the facts and circumstances of the
transaction." t As a result, U.S. MNEs preparing their transfer pricing docu-
mentation using the TNMM should be prepared to have their method challenged by
Revenue Canada.2 2
As a practical matter, U.S. MNEs operating in Canada are forced to evaluate
their transfer pricing data using both the U.S. and Canadian rules.23 While the
methods are similar, a situation could arise where the IRS accepts one method and
Revenue Canada accepts another.' If Revenue Canada makes a downward adjust-
ment, and the associated enterprise is unable to obtain a readjustment from Revenue
Canada, the associated enterprise may have to seek relief by requesting competent
authority assistance to avoid the possibility of double taxation. 235 However, under
this procedure there is no guarantee the taxpayer will avoid double taxation.236 The
competent authority procedure is simply a mutual agreement between two countries
that they will negotiate and attempt to resolve a dispute.237 Unfortunately the
taxpayer does not get to participate in the competent authority negotiations, but is
required to give the competent authorities all the information that is relevant for
resolving the issue in a timely manner.23' Therefore, all MNEs operating in Canada
should note that even if they determine the PSM or TNMM.is appropriate, they
must consider whether a traditional transaction method will produce the same
results.239 A MNE that uses a transactional profit method when a traditional
229. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1994).
230. See generally Lester, supra note 41, at 292-94 (discussing the "best method" rule).
231. See Nolan, supra note 87, at 538-39 (noting that the U.S. does not apply a strict priority of methods, but
does prefer the CUP method).
232. See Robert Turner, Transfer Pricing Update-Canada's New Penalties and Paperwork, 97 TAX NOTES
INT'L 183-17 (Sept. 22, 1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library. TNI File (stating the bottom line for U.S.
companies is that they can expect problems from Revenue Canada).
233. See Shapiro & Dodge, supra note 99.
234. See id.
235. See generally 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at ch. IV(c) (discussing the mutual agreement
procedure).
236. See Catherine Brown, The U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty: Its Impact on Cross Border Transfer of Technology,
9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 79, 117 (1996) (stating there is no requirement that the competent authority procedure must
resolve the dispute).
237. See generally Clark, supra note 63, at 1199-1200 (discussing the competent authority procedure in light
of relief from double taxation).
238. See generally 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 9M 4.57-4.59 (explaining the role the taxpayer can
and must play when a taxpayer seeks relief under the competent authority procedure).
239. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 126 (requiring taxpayers to select the transfer
pricing method that is the most appropriate to the particular facts and circumstances, and provides the highest
degree of comparability).
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Starting after 1998 Canada will impose a transfer pricing penalty on Canadian
taxpayers that fail to make reasonable efforts to determine and employ an arm's
length price or allocation.24' The penalty will also be imposed on adjustments that
are not qualifying cost contribution arrangements.242 Because the penalty is imposed
on the total adjustment, it poses a serious threat to MNEs carrying on large volumes
of cross-border trade and could easily replace double taxation as the chief concern
of MNEs operating in Canada.2 43 For instance, only where a MNE has made rea-
sonable efforts to determine and use an arm's length price or allocation in connect
with a transaction or series of transactions will a beneficial set-off be allowed.2'
This means a taxpayer who enters into two or more cross-border transactions, in
which a detrimental transfer pricing adjustment is made with respect to one or more
of the transactions, will not be able to offset any beneficial adjustment against the
detrimental adjustment unless the taxpayer has satisfied the arm's length principle
with respect to the beneficial transfer pricing adjustment.245 Therefore, theoretically,
an associated enterprise owing no taxes could still be subject to a transfer pricing
penalty if the taxpayer fails to satisfy the arm's length principle with respect to any
favorable proposed adjustment.2 6
1. Calculating the Penalty
While calculating the penalty is straightforward, the devil is in the details.
Subsection 247(1) supplies no less than four definitions that are relevant for cal-
240. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(3) (1998) (Can.).
241. See id. §§ 247(3) and 247(11)(3).
242. See id. § 247(1) (defining a qualifying cost contribution as an arrangement under which reasonable
efforts are made by the participants in the arrangement to establish a basis for contributing to, and to contribute on
that basis to, the cost of producing, developing or acquiring property, or acquiring or performing any services, in
proportion to the benefits which each participant is reasonably expected to derive from the property or services, as
the case may be, as a result of the arrangement); see also 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 8.3 (stating a cost
contribution arrangement is used by business enterprises to share the costs and risks of developing, producing or
obtaining assets, services, or rights, and to determine the nature and extent of the interests of each participant in
those assets, services, or rights).
243. See Ernst & Young, supra note 45, at 30 (finding double tax relief is the single most important issue
facing MNEs). The survey also found that 92% of Canadian respondents believe they will be subject to a transfer
pricing examination during the next two years. IL at 82.
244. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(3)(a)(iii) (1998) (Can.).
245. See generally Vincent, supra note 139 (discussing the setoff mechanism in § 247).
246. Id.
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culating a transfer pricing penalty under subsection 247(3). 247 Anyone attempting
to compute Canada's transfer pricing penalty can easily become lost in the
definitional phrases since the definitions are themselves computations.2 48 Luckily,
the burden falls on Revenue Canada to make the necessary computations for deter-
mining whether a penalty will apply to a given transaction or series of transactions.
Unfortunately for Canadian taxpayers, the burden falls on them to justify their
transfer pricing practices. 249
The penalty provision imposes a flat ten percent penalty on the total of a
taxpayer's "modified" transfer pricing capital adjustment and transfer pricing
income adjustment 50 for the taxable year where the "modified adjustment amount,"
exceeds the lesser of ten percent of the taxpayer's gross revenue for the year and
US$5,000,000.251 The taxpayer's modified adjustment amount is reached by first
computing the taxpayer's transfer pricing capital adjustment amount. Where the
related transaction involved non-depreciable property or an eligible capital
expenditure, this amount is determined by decreasing the taxpayer's cost of the non-
depreciable property or eligible capital expenditure by three-quarters of the total
adjustment amount.5 However, where the property transferred is depreciable
property, the transfer pricing capital adjustment amount is all of the reductions
made under subsection 247(2) to the taxpayer's cost of the depreciable assets.2 53 If
the taxpayer is a member of partnership, a second computation must be made. 4
The computation for determining a member of a partnership's transfer pricing
capital adjustment is similar to computing a non-partnership's transfer pricing
capital adjustment. The only difference is that the partner's transfer pricing capital
adjustment is based on the partner's share of income or loss of the partnership for
the period that is the total income or loss of the partnership for the period.2,5 5 For
example, assume a Canadian taxpayer is a member of a partnership that purchases
247. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(1) (1998) (Can.) (setting forth the four principle definitions which
are: (1) transfer pricing capital adjustment, (2) transfer pricing income adjustment, (3) transfer pricing capital setoff
adjustment and (4) transfer pricing income setoff adjustment).
248. See generally id. (defining transfer pricing capital adjustment).
249. See Borraccia, supra note 77, at 467-68 (stating that in a transfer pricing dispute, the Minister's facts
are assumed correct and the burden is on the taxpayer to rebut this assumption at the time of the assessment).
250. See generally Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(3) (1998) (Can.). The "modified" transfer pricing capital
adjustment and transfer pricing income adjustment, or simply the "modified adjustment amount," is determined by
subtracting from the total of the transfer pricing capital adjustment and the transfer pricing income adjustment any
portion of such adjustments that relate to a transaction where the taxpayer has made reasonable efforts to determine
an arm's length price or that relate to a qualifying cost contribution arrangement. Id. In addition, any transfer
pricing capital setoff adjustment or transfer pricing income setoff adjustment that relates to a qualifying cost
contribution, or where the taxpayer has made reasonable efforts, is subtracted from the total of the transfer pricing
capital and income adjustment. Id.
251. See id
252. See id (defining transfer pricing capital adjustment at (a)(1)).
253. See id. (defining transfer pricing capital adjustment at (a)(ii)).
254. See id (defining transfer pricing capital adjustment at (b)).
255. See id. (defining transfer pricing capital adjustment at (iii)-(iv)).
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a non-depreciable asset in a cross-border transaction with an associate enterprise.
If Revenue Canada makes a downward adjustment to this asset, then the partner's
transfer pricing adjustment is equal to the partner's portion of three-fourths of the
total downward adjustment. 6 With one exception, the same rule applies where the
asset is depreciable. Where the asset is depreciable, the partner's transfer pricing
capital adjustment is equal to the full amount of the partner's share of the downward
adjustment. 7 However, where the income and loss of the partnership is zero, the
partnership is deemed to have US$1,000,000 in income for determining the
taxpayer's share of the partnership's income."
The second determination that must be made to reach a taxpayer's modified
adjustment amount is to calculate the taxpayer's transfer pricing income adjust-
ment.' 9 This figure is obtained by adding all amounts by which the taxpayer's
income would increase for the year or all amounts by which a loss for a year would
decrease, assuming the decrease was the only adjustment made under subsection
247(2).260 After this figure has been determined, the next step is to add the
taxpayer's transfer pricing capital and income adjustments.26 Once this amount is
determined it is reduced to the extent that the taxpayer's transfer pricing capital and
income adjustments can reasonably be characterized as relating to a qualifying cost
contribution arrangement or by the amount of any adjustment relating to a trans-
action for which the taxpayer has made a reasonable attempt to determine an arm's
length price or allocation.2 62
Finally, to reach the modified adjustment amount, the total of a taxpayer's
transfer pricing capital and income adjustments are further reduced by the total of
a taxpayer's transfer pricing capital set-off adjustment2 63 and transfer pricing
income set-off adjustment.2" These two amounts are subtracted from the total of the
taxpayer's transfer pricing capital and income adjustments that can reasonably
relate to a qualifying cost contribution arrangement or by the amount of any adjust-
ment relating to a transaction for which the taxpayer has made a reasonable attempt
to determine an arm's length price or allocation.26' As the last sentence affirms, a
set-off will only apply to a beneficial adjustment where the taxpayer has made
reasonable efforts to determine and use an arm's length price or allocation.2
256. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(1) (1998) (Can.) (defining transfer pricing capital adjustment at
(b))).
257. See id. (defining transfer pricing capital adjustment at (b)(ii)).
258. See id. (defining transfer pricing capital adjustment at (iv)).
259. Il
260. See id. (defining transfer pricing income adjustment).
261. Id. § 247(3)(a)(I)(A)-(B).
262. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(3)(ii) (1998) (Can.).
263. See id. § 247(1) (defining transfer pricing capital setoff adjustment).
264. See id. (defining transfer pricing income setoff adjustment).
265. Id. § 247(3)(iii).
266. See generally Vincent, supra note 139 (discussing how Revenue Canada will apply the setoffmechanism
in §247).
1998 / Canada's Transfer Pricing Laws
For a simple illustration of how Revenue Canada will apply the penalty, assume
a Canadian subsidiary of a Chinese MNE, with gross revenue of US$60 million for
the taxable year 2001, enters into four transactions (A, B, C and D) with the parent
in 2001. Transactions A and B are purchases of depreciable assets made for US$10
and US$5 million, respectfully, in which Revenue Canada makes a downward
adjustment of US$5 million and US$3 million. Transaction C is a qualified
contribution arrangement where Revenue Canada makes a downward adjustment
of US$2 million, and transaction D is a non-depreciable asset purchased for US$6
million in which Revenue Canada makes a US$2 million beneficial adjustment. 67
Further assume that the taxpayer did not properly document transactions A and B.
Moreover, transaction D was determined under the profit split method and Revenue
Canada later found the cost plus method to provide a higher degree of com-
parability. Using these facts, Table I shows that the taxpayer is liable for a transfer
pricing penalty equal to US$1 million.
Table 1 Transfer Pricing Penalty Calculation
Transactions A B C D
Proposed Total Proposed






Cost n/a n/a ($2,000,000) n/a ($2,000,000)
Contribution
Arrangement
Reasonable $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Efforts
Modified Adjustment Amount $10,000,000
Compare Modified Adjustment to the Lesser of $5,000,000 $5,000,000
and 10 Percent of Gross Revenue: 10 Percent of $60,000,000
Equals $6,000,000. Penalty Applies Because
$10,000,000> $5,000,000
Penalty: $10,000,000 multiplied by 10 Total Penalty: $1,000,000
Percent
267. Since transaction D is a non-depreciable asset, for purposes of Table 1, assume the $2 million is three-
fourths of the total transfer pricing adjustment.
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2. Soundness of the Penalty Provision
It is important to recognize the ten percent penalty applies to the total of the
modified adjustment amount and not just a percentage of the tax actually
collected.268 The difference in the base to which the penalty applies dramatically
increases the Canadian transfer pricing penalty over the U.S. penalty that applies
to the additional tax imposed on the adjustment.269 Moreover, since beneficial set-
offs can only be reduced where the taxpayer can show that reasonable efforts have
been made to determine and use an arm's length price or allocation, and where the
Revenue Minister considers a beneficial adjustment appropriate,270 the penalty could
apply to Canadian companies or partnerships that have no income tax liability in
Canada even after a transfer pricing adjustment.27 Therefore, subsection 247(2)
exceeds the U.S. penalty provision, considered by many to be the most onerous in
the world.272 Although an exodus from Canada by MNEs is not going to happen, the
effect will be to restrict the competitiveness of MNEs operating in Canada.273
Furthermore, Canadian taxpayers are not able to deduct the interest assessed on
the transfer pricing adjustment.274 This in effect increases the effective transfer
pricing penalty over the U.S. transfer pricing penalty that allows taxpayers to deduct
the interest produced by the penalty.2 75 For small and medium sized associated
enterprises operating in Canada, interest payments will be a heavy burden to
carry.276 When the penalty amount and the interest are added together, the actual
Canadian penalty in a typical case is approximately seventy percent higher than the
U.S. transfer pricing penalty amount.277 Clearly, Canada's sizeable transfer pricing
penalty goes beyond the recommendations in the 1995 OECD report because the
report discourages overly harsh penalties since such penalties lead to a form of non-
compliance by intimidating associated enterprises into under-reporting income in
268. See generally Shapiro & Dodge, supra note 99, at 35-42 (comparing the U.S. transfer pricing penalty
with the transfer pricing penalty in § 247).
269. See generally Nolan, supra note 87, at 547 (discussing the U.S. transfer pricing penalty and stating the
U.S. penalty is based on the underpayment of tax due).
270. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(10) (1998) (Can.).
271. See generally Wilkie, supra note 61 (noting the inequity inherent in the penalty provision).
272. See Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 7, at 208 (asserting the U.S. transfer pricing penalties are the most
severe of all countries).
273. See generally Menyasz & Hirani, supra note 59 (noting accounting firms have voiced concerns that
tightening Canada's transfer pricing rules would affect the competitiveness of Canadian corporations).
274. See Shapiro & Dodge, supra note 99, at 38 (stating Canadian taxpayers are effectively subject to an
additional penalty because neither the interest assessed on the transfer pricing adjustment nor the penalty paid are
deductible for Canadian tax purposes).
275. See I.R.C. § 163 (1997).
276. See generally Menyasz & Hirani, supra note 59 (addressing the competitiveness of Canadian
corporations in light of § 247).
277. Shapiro & Dodge, supra note 99, at 42.
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other jurisdictions. 27 8 The irony here is that Canada has taken a page out of the U.S.
transfer pricing play book and is now the "great intimidator" of MNEs.27
3. Penalty Review Board
Canadian taxpayers receiving a reassessment as a result of a transfer pricing
adjustment can seek relief from Revenue Canada by either filing a notice of
objection or, if applicable, under the competent authority procedure.2 80 Where
Canada has a bilateral tax treaty making the competent authority procedure
available to taxpayers, this procedure should first be exhausted.2 ' As a practical
matter, the competent authority procedure is less costly than litigation and can
produce the same results. 2 Moreover, if the Canadian taxpayer is a U.S. subsidiary,
there is a good chance the dispute can be satisfactorily settled because the IRS and
Revenue Canada have a good track record for resolving competent authority
cases.28 3 However, in the event the competent authority procedure is not available,
the taxpayer has no choice but to file a notice of objection and seek relief from the
Appeals Branch of Revenue Canada, and ultimately, in the Canadian courts. 84
While the competent authority procedure should first be pursued, a taxpayer
receiving a reassessment should immediately file a notice of objection with
Revenue Canada.28 5 This ensures that if the competent authorities are unable to
reach a settlement or a fair settlement, the taxpayer can still seek relief from the
Appeals Branch.286 Should the appeals board decide against a taxpayer, the next step
would be for a taxpayer to file an appeal in the Canadian Tax Court.287 At this point
it should be remembered that the taxpayer must carry the burden of proof. 288 In
278. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1 4.26 (encouraging OECD member countries not to enact
overly harsh transfer pricing penalty systems).
279. See generally TM III, supra note 19 (stating Revenue Canada sees the United States fisc as an aggressor
rather than a victim of transfer pricing abuses between U.S. based MNEs and Canadian subsidiaries).
280. See Kingissepp Part I, supra note 79, at 322-23 (noting the competent authority procedure when
available should first be pursued).
281. Id.
282. See generally Tax Management Portfolios, Transfer Pricing: Foreign Rules and Practice Outside of
Europe, 897 TM VII (1997) (stating in light of costs and delays associated with Canadian court proceedings, a
Canadian taxpayer may seek relief from double taxation through the Canadian competent authority procedure).
283. Id.
284. See Andrew H. Kingissepp, Strategiesfor Appealing Canadian Transfer Pricing Adjustments: Part 1I,
6 J. Irr'LTAx'N 353, 355 (1995) [hereinafter Kingissepp Part II] (discussing the strategic considerations a taxpayer
must consider when appealing a transfer pricing assessment from Revenue Canada).
285. See Kingissepp Part I, supra note 79, at 326 (stating the notices of objections should comply in all
material respects with Bill C-70 requirements).
286. See Tax Management Portfolios, Transfer Pricing: Foreign Rules and Practice Outside of Europe, 897
TM VI (1997) (noting where the Appeals Branch of Revenue Canada maintains an assessment, the taxpayer is
entitled to bring an action in the Tax Court of Canada pursuant to § 169 of the Income Tax Act).
287. Id
288. See Kingissepp Part II, supra note 284, at 355 (noting the taxpayer generally has the burden of
disproving assumptions of fact made by the Minister or his officials at the time the reassessment was made).
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cases where the dispute revolves around the transfer pricing method, the taxpayer
must rely on expert witnesses to show Revenue Canada's price is inappropriate. 289
Since choosing a transfer pricing method is not an exact science, the strength of a
taxpayer's argument lies in the strength of the taxpayer's expert witnesses.290 In any
event, a taxpayer and her tax practitioner must weigh important legal considerations
when considering whether to navigate through the appeals process.
D. Contemporaneous Documentation
Taxpayer compliance in Canada is based on the self-assessment system.291
When a taxpayer tries to take advantage of this system, and later becomes the focus
of an audit, Revenue Canada requires that the taxpayer produce documents sup-
porting the position taken.29 With respect to transfer pricing documentation,
Canadian taxpayers are now expected to go to great lengths to prepare or obtain
written materials demonstrating that their transfer prices satisfy the arm's length
principle.293 Canada requires associated enterprises to contemporaneously prepare
a non-exclusive list of documents that readily demonstrate to Revenue Canada that
the taxpayer is actively reviewing its transfer pricing practices and polices.2 94 The
starting point for considering Canada's transfer pricing documentation requirements
is subsection 247(4). This subsection is Revenue Canada's latest weapon for
ensuring that taxpayers engaging in cross-border transactions with related parties
document their transfer pricing transactions in accordance with the 1995 OECD
report.
295
289. See Borraccia, supra note 77, at 468 (stating Revenue Canada will attempt to support its assessment
through cross-examination of the taxpayer's witnesses).
290. See Kingissepp Part II, supra note 284, at 358-59 (asserting if the taxpayer's transfer pricing case is
likely headed for court, the strength of the taxpayer's case likely will depend heavily on the effectiveness of the
taxpayer's experts). At a minimum, the taxpayer's expert should be very knowledgeable in that particular area, and
be widely recognized as one of the leaders in the field. Id.
291. See Revenue Canada, Homepage (visited Feb. 12, 1998), <http://www.re.gc.ca> (noting each year
Canada provides taxpayers with tax return forms). It is the responsibility of the taxpayer to secure the proper tax
return form and properly prepare the form before returning it to Revenue Canada. Id. In fact, to help facilitate
taxpayer compliance, Revenue Canada has made it possible for taxpayer to download tax return forms via the
Internet. Id.
292. See generally Przysuski & Mikhail, supra note 54, at 941 (discussing how the production of documents
in a transfer pricing dispute helps Revenue Canada resolve the conflict).
293. See generally Tower, supra note 100 (isting the categories of documents that taxpayers must prepare
to justify their transfer prices).
294. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(a)(I)-(vi) (1998) (Can.).
295. See Press Release 97-076, supra note 11 (stating the proposed documentation requirements adhere to
the 1995 OECD report).
345
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1. Statutory Requirements
Subsection 247(4) requires MNEs to document their transfer pricing based on
the arm's length principle with information available at the time of the deter-
rination.2 96 This type of documentation is commonly referred to as contem-
poraneous documentation because the taxpayer must gather and analyze all the
information that is reasonably available at the time the transfer pricing transaction
occurred.297 By requiring taxpayers to document their transfer pricing transactions
contemporaneously, taxpayers must determine before the transaction is consum-
mated whether their transfer pricing is appropriate for tax purposes.298 Under
subsection 247(4), this means taxpayers must include in their documentation at least
six different categories of information.
Chief among these requirements is the duty to prepare a functional analysis.
299
A functional analysis seeks to identify the principal functions performed by each
party by taking into account all the functions performed and risks undertaken by the
parties to a transaction.3° Because a functional analysis is the starting point for
many of Revenue Canada's transfer pricing audits,30' requiring MNEs to prepare a
functional analysis minimizes the use of hindsight and helps Revenue Canada
properly assess whether the taxpayer's transfer pricing satisfies the arm's length
principle.' 2 This type of analysis is especially useful for determining a party's share
in a cost contribution arrangement (CCA), because a functional analysis provides
an auditor with an overall view of the transfer pricing transaction from the tax-
payer's viewpoint.30 3 Since the value of each participant's contribution to a CCA is
supposed to be equal to the benefit each party expects to derive from the arrange-
ment, analyzing the functions and risks between the parties can determine to some
extent the degree of allocation.3 4
296. Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 82.
297. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1.6.
298. See generally Turner, supra note 232 (noting the significance of the contemporaneous documentation
requirements).
299. IncomeTax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(a)(vi) (1998) (Can.) (stating a description of "the functions performed,
the property used or contributed and the risks assumed, in respect of the transaction, by the participants in the
transaction" must be prepared).
' 300. See generally 1995 OECD repo-, supra note 2, at U 1.20-1.27 (discussing the purpose and function
of a functional analysis).
301. See Transfer Pricing: Canadian Auditors Seek U.S. Affliate's Section 6662 Studies, Officials Say, 1997
DA'LYTAX REP. 51 d7 (1997), available in WL 1997 DTR 51 d7 (describing how Revenue Canada's auditors are
seeking the functional analysis prepared by U.S. affiliates to help determine whether a Canadian taxpayer's transfer
pricing adheres to the arm's length principle).
302. See Przysuski & Mikhail, supra note 54, at 941 (stating documentation in support of the CUP method
needs to be based on information reasonably available at the time of the transfer price determination so as to
preclude the use of hindsight).
303. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(1) (1998) (Can.) (defining cost contribution arrangement).
304. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 149 (discussing what must transpire for a CCA
to satisfy the arm's length principle).
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Along with a functional analysis, subsection 247(4) requires taxpayers to
prepare a complete and accurate description of the terms and conditions of the
transaction and how they relate to the terms and conditions of other transactions
between the associated enterprises.35sThis necessarily requires taxpayers to prepare
documentation describing the property or services to which the transaction
relates, 3°6 to-explain the identity of the parties, and to explain the parties' relation-
ship at the time the transaction was entered into. 7 Since these three requirements
are common to all transfer pricing transactions, associated enterprises will find
preparing this information routine .3 8 However, the documentation requirements do
not end here. MNEs are also expected to prepare documents describing the data
used to determine whether the transfer pricing method being employed satisfies the
arm's length principle."° This requires taxpayers to explain and defend why they
chose to base their transfer prices on the particular information. In preparing
documentation to show how the transfer pricing method has been determined, tax
practitioners need to analyze and consider fully each transfer pricing method and
show that the method being used provides the highest degree of comparability bet-
ween controlled and uncontrolled transactions.3"' If a transactional profit method
is used, this will be the taxpayer's best opportunity to persuade Revenue Canada
that its transfer pricing method is consistent with transactional conditions in the
open market.312 Therefore, since documentation is a taxpayer's first line of defense
against a transfer pricing adjustment, a taxpayer should fully explain to Revenue
Canada why their data is applicable to the method being used.
Finally, taxpayers must prepare documentation describing any assumptions or
business strategies or policies that influenced the setting of prices 3  Business
strategies may include factors bearing upon a taxpayer's market position. 4 For
example; a taxpayer seeking to increase its market share might temporarily charge
an associated enterprise a price that is lower than the price charged for the same
product in an uncontrolled transaction. The idea is that the current reduction will
lead to higher profits in the future. Where this is the case, a taxpayer with a market
305. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(a)(ii) (1998) (Can.).
306. Id. § 247(4)(a)(I).
307. Id. § 247(4)(a)(iii).
308. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 5.16 (stating there are certain features common to any transfer
pricing inquiry).
309. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(a)(v) (1998) (Can.).
310. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 82.
311. Id. at 25 (stating the CUP method will provide the highest degree of comparability than any of the
other recommended methods).
312. See generally id. at 24 (stating Revenue Canada prefers the traditional transaction methods over the
transactional profit methods).
313. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(vi) (1998) (Can.).
314. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 16 (explaining business strategies are factors
that can affect comparability, as they influence the price that arm's length parties would charge for a product).
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penetration strategy needs fully to disclose this information to Revenue Canada.315
If the business strategy is plausible and can be characterized as a transaction that an
independent enterprise would accept, Revenue Canada is unlikely to make a down-
ward adjustment. 6 However, failure to inform Revenue Canada of this strategy or
satisfy any of the documentation requirements can lead to a penalty. 7
a. Reasonable Efforts
As an incentive for MNEs to take the contemporaneous documentation require-
ments seriously, subsection 247(4) is tied to the penalty provision in subsection
247(3).318 A taxpayer is deemed to have failed to make reasonable efforts to deter-
mine and use an arm's length price or allocation unless the taxpayer satisfies the
documentation requirements in subsection 247(4).2' In other words, a taxpayer's
transfer pricing income adjustment and transfer pricing capital adjustment will not
be reduced for determining the penalty under subsection 247(3) unless the docu-
mentation requirements have been met. 20 Similarly, unless the documentation
requirements are met, the taxpayer's transfer pricing income set-off adjustment and
transfer pricing capital set-off adjustment will not reduce the taxpayer's transfer
pricing income and capital adjustments.321 Therefore, even though the docu-
mentation requirements will increase a MNEs compliance burden, it is critical the
taxpayer prepares enough documentation to meet the reqtirements of subsection
247(4). 3'2 However, a transfer pricing penalty can still be encountered where a
taxpayer does not adhere to the reporting requirements."
315. See generally 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1.31-1.35 (discussing when business strategies can
be taken into account when determining the comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions).
316. See generally Vincent, supra note 139 (stating if the transaction has a bona fide business purpose, the
transaction is unlikely to be recharacterized).
317. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(a)(1)-(vi) (1998) (Can.) (requiring taxpayers to prepare a list of
documents or fall victim to the penalty in § 247(3)).
318. Id § 247(4).
319. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 178 (stating that whether a taxpayer has made
reasonable efforts to determine and use arm's length prices or allocations is a question of fact). Ifa taxpayer takes
all reasonable steps to ensure its transfer pricing is in conformity with the arm's length principle, then the taxpayer
is deemed to have made reasonable efforts with respect to the penalty in § 247(3). Id. See generally Schwinn, supra
note 46 (reporting that Revenue Canada considers applying a transfer pricing penalty where the taxpayer does not
properly prepare documentation and utilized a transfer pricing method).
320. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4) (1998) (Can.).
321. Id.
322. See Shapiro & Dodge, supra note 99, at 43 (asserting that Canadian taxpayers must develop a transfer
pricing policy to have meaningful documentation).
323. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(b) (1998) (Can.).
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b. Reporting Requirements
The rule deeming a taxpayer not to have made a reasonable effort extends to
two reporting requirements.3" First, a taxpayer is deemed not to have made
reasonable efforts under subsection 247(4) unless the taxpayer has assembled all the
required documents within the taxpayer's documentation-due date.3z In the case of
a partnership, all the documentation must be compiled by the day on which a return
is required to be filed by the partnership.326 All other taxpayers are required to
assemble such documentation by the person's filing due date for the year.327 This
means that even if a NINE has satisfied the arm's length principle with respect to
a transfer pricing method, the MNE can still be deemed to have failed to meet the
arm's length principle if all the documentation has not been timely compiled.
328
Second, the deeming rule applies if a taxpayer fails to provide Revenue Canada
the proper transfer pricing documents within three months of a written request.
329
While this rule is easy to understand, MNEs should not assume that Revenue
Canada will wait until the end of the year to make a document request.330 For
example, assume a corporate taxpayer's tax return is due on December 31, 2001,
and on February 1, 2001, the taxpayer purchases a fixed asset from an associated
enterprise in New Zealand. Under subsection 247(4)(a) the taxpayer must have
completed and prepared all transfer pricing documents by December 31, 2001, to
avoid the deeming rule.331 However, Revenue Canada could make a written request
for documentation with respect to this transaction on March 1, 2001.332 This would
then require the taxpayer to obtain or prepare documents providing a complete and
accurate description of the transaction to Revenue Canada by June 1, 2001.
Therefore, because it takes time to compile and analyze transfer pricing
information, documenting their transactions contemporaneously is important for
MNEs.
3 33
324. See generally Vincent, supra note 139 (discussing the reporting requirements).
325. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(1) (1998) (Can.) (defining documentation-due date)
326. See id. (explaining that subsection (b) under documentation-due date states with respect to "a
partnership, [the documents are due] the day on or before which a return is required by section 229 of the Income
Tax Regulations...or would be required to be so filed if that section applied to the partnership").
327. See id. (defining documentation-due date at subsection (a)).
328. See generally Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 82 (explaining under what
circumstances the deeming rule will apply).
329. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(c) (1998) (Can.).
330. See generally Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 80-90 (implying there is no
provision in § 247 that requires Revenue Canada to wait until the taxpayer's documentation-due date before making
a written request for documents).
331. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4)(c) (1998) (Can.).
332. Id.
333. See generally Inland Revenue, supra note 11, at f 290-301 (discussing theimportance of determining
transfer prices at the time the transaction is entered into).
349
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2. Compliance Burden
The 1995 OECD report recommends that tax authorities take great care to
balance the need for documents against the cost and administrative burden to
taxpayers.334 Generally, this means that tax authorities should not expect taxpayers
to prepare or obtain documents beyond the minimum needed to make a reasonable
assessment of whether the taxpayer's transfer pricing satisfies the arm's length
principle.335 While Information Circular 87-2R accepts this axiom,336 it is clear
subsection 247(4) is heavily balanced in favor of Revenue Canada.337 Since the
documentation requirements in subsection 247(4) are not merely guidance on what
documents should be prepared or obtained, but a prescriptive list of documents that
must be complete and accurate in all material respects, 338 MNEs will have to expend
substantial amounts of money to ensure their documents satisfy Revenue Canada.3 9
According to Information Circular 87-2R, taxpayers need to prepare or obtain
documents in accordance with the same prudent business management principles
that would govern the process of evaluating a business decision of similar com-
plexity and importance. 340 Depending on the facts and circumstances of the
transaction, this means that taxpayers may have to prepare documents beyond those
listed in subsection 247(4).34t While considering whether the prudent business
management test is met, a prudent businessperson needs to balance compliance
costs with the significance of the transaction to the taxpayer's business. 342 Where
Revenue Canada determines a businessperson did not act like a prudent business-
person an adjustment is sure to follow. Permitting Revenue Canada to determine
when a businessperson is acting like a businessperson is a burden that MNEs can
334. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at H 5.6-5.15 (cautioning tax administrations to ensure that
taxpayers do not incur extraordinary expenses to secure documents).
335. Id. at 5.7 (stating the taxpayer should be expected to have prepared or obtained such documents only
if they are indispensable for a reasonable assessment of whether the transfer pricing satisfies the arm's length
principle and can be obtained or prepared by the taxpayer without a disproportionately high cost being incurred).
336. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 80 (stating the documents required to be
obtained or prepared are those pursuant to principles of prudent business management).
337. See generally Menyasz & Hirani, supra note 59 (quoting Steven Hannes, a partner with Fulbright &
Jaworski in Washington, D.C., as stating that subsection 247(4) goes very far in requiring MNEs to reveal the
underlying facts of their transactions).
338. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(4) (1998) (Can.).
339. See generally O'Conner & Shapiro, supra note 58 (stating documentation requirements are expected
to significantly increase Canadian multinationals' compliance burden).
340. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 80; see generally Wilkie, supra note 61
(discussing the contemporaneous documentation requirements along with the prudent business management
principle).
341. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 84 (asserting that the list of documents
required to be prepared under § 247(4) is not intended to be an exhaustive list of documents necessary to
substantiate that the taxpayer's transfer pricing is in accordance with the arm's length principle). The list in §
247(4) is also not exhaustive with respect to determining whether a taxpayer has made reasonable efforts to
determine an arm's length price or allocation. Id.
342. Id. at 80.
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scarcely affordY 3 Accordingly, because professional fees for work on transfer
pricing disputes with Revenue Canada can be enormous, MNEs should hire pro-
fessionals to prepare their transfer pricing documentation to insure they have made
reasonable efforts in preparing their documentation. Therefore, the only winners
under subsection 247(4) are accountants, lawyers, valuation experts and other
professionals.
One benefit of having professionals prepare documentation is that such actions
will assist taxpayers in filing correct tax returns.344 This is an important point
because Revenue Canada determines whether the taxpayer's transfer prices satisfy
the arm's length principle even if the documentation is incomplete 45 Having
professionals prepare documentation, therefore, is likely to save the business from
a transfer pricing adjustment and penalty.3 6 This is especially true where the trans-
action between associated enterprises involves intangible property, intra-group
services or a cost contribution arrangement. 47
V. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Establishing transfer pricing in transactions involving intangible property, intra-
group services and cost contribution arrangements raises several controversial
transfer pricing issues. 4 8 These types of transactions are highly complex and have
special characteristics that complicate the search for comparablesY49 Applying the
arm's length principle to these transactions requires tax authorities and associated
enterprises to gather and analyze complex sets of data that can only approximate the
343. See generally Toulin, supra note 57 (reporting tax experts consider § 247 as giving Revenue Canada
a great deal of leeway in questioning pricing practices and business arrangements).
344. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 5.4.
345. See Przysuski & Mikhail, supra note 54, at 941 (stating inadequate record keeping may give rise to a
reassessment wherein doubt is resolved in favor of Revenue Canada).
346. See generally Ernst & Young, Ernst & Young 1995 Transfer Pricing Documentation Survey, 96 TAX
NOTES TODAY 162-77 (Aug. 19, 1996), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File (finding that 76% of the
MNEs employing transfer pricing professionals were satisfied with their documentation). Of the MNEs surveyed,
62% utilized external economists/tax advisors. Id. Given the increased number of business units subject to § 247
and the amount of money at stake, it seems evident that the role transfer pricing professionals play will only
increase. Id.
347. See Marc M. Levey & Lawrence W. Shapiro, OECD Transfer Pricing Draft Targets Excessive
Documentation, 6 J. INT'LTAX'N 244 (1995) (discussing the 1995 OECD's report's documentation on the transfer
or intangible property, intra-group services and cost contribution arrangements).
348. See generally Donald Watkins & Robert Spindler, Letter to Canada's Chief of International Taxation
and Market Analysis from Joint Committee on Taxation of Canadian Bar Association and Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants Concerning Part 11 of OECD Discussion Draft on Guidelines for Transfer Pricing, 96 TAX
NOTES INT'L 145-32 (Jul. 26, 1996), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File (discussing the special
considerations for intangible property, intra-group services and cost contribution arrangements from a Canadian
perspective).
349. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 16.13 (discussing the application of the arm's length principle
to the transfer of intangible property).
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arm's length principle.350 In establishing arm's length pricing, therefore, the only
solution is to have cooperation between tax authorities and MNEs.35 ' No where is
this truer than where the transaction involves the transfer of intangible property.
352
A. Intangible Property
Information Circular 87-2R recognizes that there may be problems applying the
arm's length principle to intangible property because of the difficulty and un-
certainty encountered with attributing an arm's length value to such transfers.353
Since intangible property is often unique to a particular business and may have con-
siderable value, but relatively no book value on the company's balance sheets,
applying the CUP method to determine an arm's length price for the sale or licences
of the intangible may not be possible because of the lack of comparable trans-
actions.354 Nevertheless, where the same or comparable property has been sold or
licensed to arm's length parties, or where the business controlling the intangible
property has received genuine offers from independent enterprises for the
intangible, Information Circular 87-2R recommends taxpayers use the CUP method
to determine an arm's length price or allocation.355
In cases involving highly valuable or unique intangible property, the traditional
transaction methods may be impossible to apply, and a taxpayer may have to resort
to a transactional profit method.356 Where this situation arises, Information Circular
87-2R recommends that taxpayers employ the profit split method.357 When using
the profit split method, taxpayers must remember that using hindsight in deter-
mining the value or expected profit to be received from the intangible property is
not appropriate.358 Moreover, when valuing the intangible property, Information
Circular 87-2R cautions taxpayers to pay close attention to the terms and conditions
that independent enterprises would expect to protect their respective positions.359
350. See generally Watkins & Spindler, supra note 348 (recommending that Canada remain flexible with
respect to applying the arm's length principle to transactions involving intangible property, intra group services and
cost contribution arrangements).
351. Id. (maintaining cooperation between taxpayers and tax authorities is the only sensible means for
resolving transfer pricing issues).
352. See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 71, at 908 (stating that some of the most difficult transfer pricing
problems relate to the pricing of transactions involving intangible property).
353. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 58 (asserting that transfers of intangible
property raises specific issues associated with the difficulty of attributing an arm's length value to such transfers).
354. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 347, at 245.
355. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 59.
356. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at V 6.28-6.35 (discussing the application of the arm's length
principle when valuation is highly uncertain at the time of the transaction).
357. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 160.
358. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 2.33.
359. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 63; Marc M. Levey& Salvador M. Borraccia,
Draft Amendments to Canadian Transfer Pricing Rules 77ghten Taxpayers' Compliance Burden, 8 J. INT'L TAX
498 (1997), available in LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File (describing when a party would be expected to protect
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For example, if the intangible property is highly valuable or unique, and cannot be
easily valued, it is likely the independent enterprise selling or leasing the intangible
property would insist upon a short term agreement and a price adjustment clause to
protect its interests.36° Where these terms and conditions are missing from a
controlled transaction, Revenue Canada will determine the value based on such
factors.36' Moreover, the value of the intangible property can have a bearing on
establishing an arm's length price for intra-group services. 62
B. Intra-Group Services
Intra-group services are often linked to arrangements for transferring intangible
property.3 63 For example, an associated enterprise receiving an intangible under a
know-how contract may need the contract to contain a service clause that requires
the associated enterprise transferring the intangible to provide highly skilled
personnel to assist in the commercial activity.3 4 Since under the arm's length
principle it is necessary to determine whether the services performed are services
for which a charge is justified, intangible property that is highly valuable or unique
may require high service charges.3 65 However, where the intangible property is not
unique and an independent entity can perform the service activity, Revenue Canada
is more likely to scrutinize the intra-group service charge.36
After it is determined that an intra-group service charge is justified, the next
step is to determine whether the amount charged is in accordance with the arm's
length principle. 367 This first requires identifying the amount being charged for the
services. There are two methods for determining such a charge: (1) the direct charge
their interests under Information Circular 87-2R).
360. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 1 6.30 (discussing what measures an a independent enterprise
would likely take when anticipated benefits alone do not provide adequate protection against the risks posed by
valuing intangible property).
361. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 247(2)(a) (1998) (Can.) (allowing Revenue Canada to adjust the pricing
of the amounts to the quantum or nature that would have been determined if the terms and conditions were those
that would have been determined between persons dealing at arm's length).
362. See Carlson et a]., supra note 172, at 344 (noting it may be appropriate to apply separate transfer pricing
methods to services and property when they are provided together).
363. See Jack Bernstein, Canada-U.S. Transfers of Technology: A Canadian Perspective, 15 TAX NOTES
INT'L 1693, 1699 (1997) (noting that it is common for service fees to be part of the transfer of technology).
364. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 7.3 (recognizing that intra-group arrangements for rendering
services are sometimes linked to arrangements for transferring goods or intangible property).
365. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 347, at 245 (stating applying the arm's length principle to controlled
transactions involving the transfer of unique intangible property may be difficult because the associated enterprises
might structure the transaction in a way that unrelated companies would not contemplate).
366. See generally Purdy & Zanchelli, supra note 46, at 398 (discussing Canada's stepped up scrutiny of
management fees).
367. Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at% 68 (stating where a charge for services isjustified
the amount charged should be in accordance with the arm's length principle).
353
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mbthod and (2) the indirect-charge method.368 Revenue Canada prefers the direct
charge method because it allows the service performed and the basis for the pay-
ment to be clearly identified.369 Where, however, the same service has been
performed for many non-arm's length parties and the service rendered cannot be
directly attributable to each party, the indirect-charge method must be used.37° Once
service charges have been identified, the last step is to employ a transfer pricing
method.
In applying the arm's length principle to intra-group services, Information
Circular 87-2R and the 1995 OECD report recommend the CUP method. 37' The
CUP method is appropriate where comparable services are provided between
independent enterprises or where the associated enterprise has provided the services
to an independent enterprise in comparable circumstances.372 Lacking comparables,
the circular recommends that the CPM be considered.373 Only in exceptional cases,
for example where the CUP and CPM cannot be applied, should a taxpayer rely on
a transactional profit method.374
C. Cost Contribution Arrangements
Cost contribution arrangements present a special challenge to Revenue Canada
and taxpayers because the traditional transfer pricing questions, i.e., the transfer of
property or services, do not arise.375 The distinguishing feature between a CCA and
ordinary intra-group transfers is that participants in a CCA make contributions to
ajoint activity where the compensation intended by the participants is the expected
benefit to each from the pooling of resources and skills.376 Typically, these types of
arrangements include research and development (R&D) arrangements and arrange-
368. See generally 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 9M 7.19-7.28 (discussing the application of the direct
and indirect-charge methods).
369. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 1 75 (noting Revenue Canada's preference of
the direct charge method over the indirect charge method).
370. See id. at 76 (asserting where an indirect allocation is used, it should result in a charge that is
comparable to that which independent enterprises would accept).
371. See generally Levey & Borraccia, supra note 359 (discussing how Information Circular 87-2R treats
intra-group services).
372. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 69 (noting where a service is rendered by
arm's length parties or the service provider renders the service for arm's length parties, the price charged in those
circumstances is a good indication of the arm's length price).
373. Id. at 70.
374. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 3.1.
375. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 347, at 247 (noting the complexity surrounding cost contribution
arrangements).
376. See OECD Summary of Revised Guidelines on Cost Contribution Arrangements, 191 DAtLY TAX REP.
L-2 (1997), available in WL 191 DTR L-2 [hereinafter OECD Summary] (stating that a CCA is a contractual
arrangement rather than necessarily a distinct juridical entity or permanent establishment of all the participants).
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ments for the joint development of intangible property.37" In fact, a common type
of CCA is an agreement for the R&D of intangible property.
378
To apply the arm's length principle to a CCA, it is necessary to examine
whether each participant expects benefits. 379 Information Circular 87-2R maintains
that only participants having a reasonable expectation of exploiting or using the
results from the CCA can be considered participants. 380 For example, the parti-
cipants may choose to carry-out part of the CCA activity in a separate company.
Even though this separate company may be a subsidiary of one participant, if this
separate company only performs a service without any reasonable expectation to
benefit from the results of the CCA, then the separate company is not a participant
to the CCA.
38 t
Once the expectation of mutual benefit has been determined, the arm's length
principle requires the calculation of each participant's contribution to the arrange-
ment.382 The value of each participant's contribution is determined by comparing
what independent enterprises in comparable circumstances would assign to that
contribution.383 Since the amount of each participant's contribution is unlikely to
be determined in a straightforward manner, except where the contribution is made
in cash, this determination must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.384 Where,
however, the contribution is services or associated operating cost, Revenue Canada
considers the arm's length value to be the cost to the provider.85 In the event a
participant's contribution is not equal to the expected benefit, a balancing payment
may be required to adjust the participants' proportionate share of contributions.386
377. See generally Turner, supra note 232 (stating that under § 247, a cost contribution arrangement applies
to a broader range of activities and services, and not just the traditional shared development of new products and
ideas); see also OECD Releases Cost Contribution Arrangements Under Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 97 TAX
NOTES INT'L 190-20 (1997), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TN File (asserting that cost contribution
arrangements are most frequently used in the research and development area, but can also be used by business
enterprises to share costs and risks of developing, producing or obtaining any assets, services or rights).
378. See generally OECD Summary, supra note 376 (noting that CCAs are not confined to the development
of intangible property and include arrangements for the sharing of costs and risks for developing or acquiring other
types of property and services).
379. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 8.10 (stating that a party may not be considered a participant
if the party does not have a reasonable expectation that it will benefit from the CCA activity).
380. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 49 (stating that the expectation of mutual
benefit is fundamental).
381. See Bernstein, supra note 228, at 1707 (discussing the requirement of reasonable expectation).
382. See Albertina M. Fernandez, The Week In Review, October 6, 1997, 97 TAXNoTEs INT'L 193-11 (1997),
available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
383. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 8.8 (discussing how to apply the arm's length principle in
relation to a CCA).
384. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 347, at 247-48 (noting the arm's length principle attempts to determine
whether the allocation reflects the relative benefits inuring to the parties which is not very easy when the property
is in-kind).
385. Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 50.
386. See generally OECD Summary, supra note 376 (stating a balancing payment should be treated as an
addition to the costs of payer and as a reimbursement, and therefore a reduction, of costs to the recipient).
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Finally, the arm's length principle requires a determination of whether the
allocation is appropriate. This means it must be determined whether each parti-
cipant's proportionate share of the overall contributions is consistent with the
participant's proportionate share of the overall expected benefits.387 Since there is
no universal rule to determine each participant's share of the benefits, Information
Circular 87-2R supports the use of an allocation key as an indirect measure to
estimate the additional income to be derived from the arrangement. 38 The appro-
priateness of a particular allocation key will depend on the nature of the CCA
activity and the relationship between the allocation key and the expected benefits. 8 9
Moreover, to help Revenue Canada determine whether the allocation key and the
CCA overall satisfy the arm's length principle, Information Circular 87-2R requires
that taxpayers prepare additional documentation.39
The additional documentation requirements in Information Circular 87-2R
relating to CCAs must be prepared or obtained in the same manner as the docu-
ments required to be prepared under subsection 247(4).39 ' Among the list of
documents concerning a CCA that must be prepared are the procedures for entering
or withdrawing from the CCA and the policies and procedures governing balancing
payments.392 This requires a taxpayer to document any material changes to the
CCA.393 While all these documentation requirements can be mind-numbing, one
way a taxpayer can navigate through many of the highly technical transfer pricing
rules is to enter into an Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) with Revenue
Canada.394
387. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 8.19 (discussing whether a participant's allocation is
appropriate).
388. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at V 52-53 (discussing an allocation key which
seeks to reflect the participants' proportionate shares of the expected benefits); see, e.g., 1995 OECD report, supra
note 2, at 8.19 (stating the possibilities for allocation keys include sales, units used, produced, or sold, gross or
operating profit, the number of employees, capital invested, and so forth).
389. See Levey & Shapiro, supra note 347, at 248 (stating that in a written cost contribution arrangement,
the terms and conditions should be defined precisely and the participants should be able to demonstrate that the
terms have been or will be carried out in practice).
390. See generally Levey & Borraccia, supra note 359 (listing the nine areas of documentation Information
Circular 87-2R indicates taxpayers need to document for a cost contribution arrangement).
391. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 86 (stating the documentation requirements
also apply to CCAs and must include additional information).
392. See id. (providing a list of nine areas CCA documentation must address).
393. Id at 87.
394. See Ernst & Young, supra note 45, at 69 (finding 14% of respondents report having used an APA and
36% would consider using an APA in the future). The survey also discovered that Canadian and United States
companies are most likely to utilize an APA in the future, with 57% and 50%, respectively, responding
affirmatively. Id.
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VI. ADVANCED PRICING AGREEMENTS
An APA is an agreement between the taxpayer and Revenue Canada to deter-
mine in advance the appropriate transfer pricing methodology, and how that
methodology is to be applied to specific cross-border transactions between
associated enterprises. 5 The APA process in Canada has been in effect since 1993
and provides taxpayers with an alternative for resolving intercompany transfer
pricing issues.396 Once a taxpayer and Revenue Canada enter into an APA, the APA
is considered binding on both parties.397 If the taxpayer complies with the APA's
terms, Revenue Canada considers the methodology being used to satisfy the arm's
length principle. 98 Therefore, the APA offers Canadian taxpayers the opportunity
to resolve potential transfer pricing disputes while reaching an understanding with
Revenue Canada that if the taxpayer adheres to the terms and conditions of the
APA, the taxpayer's transfer pricing method will not be challenged.3 9 Considering
the onerous penalty provision in subsection 247(3), taxpayers should find the APA
very attractive.
By using the APA process, taxpayers can reduce their chances of receiving a
transfer pricing penalty 0t For example, the penalty in subsection 247(3) applies
when a taxpayer fails to use a transfer pricing method that provides the highest
degree of comparability when compared to other methods.402 When an APA exists
between a taxpayer and Revenue Canada, the transfer pricing method will already
be established. Therefore, assuming the taxpayer uses the method agreed upon in
the APA, the taxpayer is considered to have satisfied the arm's length principle with
395. See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 71, at 908.
396. See Transfer Pricing: Revenue Canada Processing Multilateral APA Involving Five Tax Jurisdictions,
1996 DAILY TAX REP. 97 d4 (1996), available in WL 1996 97 d4 (noting that as of March 1996, Canada's APA
program had 35 pending APAs and up to seven finalized APAs).
397. See Brian J. Arnold, Revenue Canada to Provide Advance Pricing Agreement Service, 12 TAX NOTES
INT'L 726, 727 (1993) (discussing the binding effect of the APA on Revenue Canada and the taxpayer).
398. See DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CANADA, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING: ADVANCED PRICING
AGREEMENTS (APA), 3 (Information Circular 94-4, Dec. 30, 1994) [hereinafter ADVANCED PRICING
AGREEMENTS]. This circular provides an overview of the advanced pricing agreement in Canada. Id. at 2. It
illuminates the main features of the program and sets out the basic requirements taxpayers must meet to obtain an
APA. Id.
399. See William Innes & Janice McCart, Transfer-Pricing Disputes: Access to and Disclosure of
Information, 43 CAN. TAX J. 821, 859 (1995) (stating that APAs are, in effect, a mechanism to resolve transfer
pricing disputes before they arise and a process in which extensive information may be produced).
400. See Steven Grodnitzky, Revenue Canada Grapples with Transfer Pricing Comments, 15 TAX NOTES
INT'L 1836, 1837 (1997) (reporting in light of the new transfer pricing rules, Revenue Canada expects an increase
in requests for APAs).
401. See Tax Management Portfolios, Foreign Income Transfer Pricing: Alternative Practical Strategies
Detailed Analysis, III. Factors to Consider in Deciding Whether to Seek an APA, 890 TM 111 (1997) [hereinafter
Detailed Analysis] (stating the primary benefit of seeking an APA is to obtain certainty of result with respect to a
defined set of transactions).
402. See Draft Information Circular 87-2R, supra note 19, at 79 (stating Revenue Canada considers the
making of reasonable efforts requires the application of a recommended method by the taxpayer).
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respect to the methodology and no penalty will follow from applying the method. 0 3
Moreover, since the method has been settled in advance, the taxpayer does not have
to compare the methods to determine which method produces the highest degree of
comparability.4 As imagined, this can substantially reduce the amount of data and
analysis needed to meet the documentation requirements.4 5
Although taxpayers entering into APAs must still comply with the contem-
poraneous documentation requirements, the APA allows taxpayers to streamline
their documentation.406 Since taxpayers must initiate the APA process, the burden
is on the taxpayer to convince Revenue Canada to accept their APA proposal.40 7 To
meet this burden taxpayers must prepare a detailed explanation and analysis of each
method, and set out why the proposed method provides the most reliable measure
of the arm's length principle."5 In other words, applying for an APA requires the
taxpayer to meet the contemporaneous documentation requirements in subsection
247(4).40 Therefore, if Revenue Canada accepts the APA proposal, the taxpayer
only has to focus on one transfer pricing method and will know what details and
specific information Revenue Canada wants to satisfy the contemporaneous docu-
mentation requirements.4 t°
Given the breadth of section 247, taxpayers with high amounts of cross-border
intercompany trade may want to seek an APA.41 t If costs of seeking an APA are a
problem, the APA can be limited to one or two goods or services. 42 There is no
requirement that an APA must cover all the goods and services transferred by an
associated enterprise.413 Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how Revenue Canada
403. See ADVANCED PRICING AGREEMENTS, supra note 398, at 3 (stating a APA prospectively confirms
an appropriate transfer pricing method, and its application, to specific cross-border non-arm's length transactions
for a specified term).
404. See generally Levey & Borraccia, supra note 359 (discussing the ranking of transfer pricing methods
in the preferred order that Revenue Canada expects).
405. See generally Blake M. Murray & Andrew H. Kingissepp, Canada Proposes Rigorous New Transfer
Pricing Rules, 8 J. INT'LTAx490 (1997), electronic version (explaining the data and analysis needed to satisfy the
penalty provision in subsection 247(3)).
406. See Arnold, supra note 397, at 727 (noting once the APA is entered into Revenue Canada will consider
itself bound and the taxpayer will only need to concentrate on the transfer pricing method agreed upon).
407. See ADVANCED PRICING AGREEMENTS, supra note 398, at 15 (discussing how a taxpayer can request
one or more prefiling meetings with Revenue Canada to explore the suitability of an APA).
408. See Innes & McCart, supra note 399, at 859 (asserting that if a Canadian taxpayer chooses to seek an
APA, extensive information must be provided to Revenue Canada).
409. See Snyder, supra note 5, at 1066-67 (noting that the taxpayer must comply with the terms of the APA
for the APA to have any affect).
410. See generally Detailed Analysis, supra note 401 (discussing the cost of seeking an APA).
411. See generally Turner, supra note 232 (stating he expects more taxpayers will seek comfort on their
transfer pricing policies through Canada's APA process).
412. See generally DetailedAnalysis, supra note 401 (stating that a significant part of the expenses a taxpayer
will incur result from the need to collect and analyze a significant volume of data to support the transfer pricing
method).
413. See ADVANCED PRICING AGREEMENTS, supra note 398, at 3 (stating that the APA prospectively
confirms an appropriate transfer pricing method and its application to specific cross-border non-arm's length
transactions for a specific term).
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will respond to an APA request in light of section 247. If Revenue Canada's
approach to section 247 is inflexible, this may enhance the attractiveness of an
APA, particularly in complex situations.4 4
VII. CONCLUSION
Overall, section 247 and Information Circular 87-2R facilitate the effective
administration of taxation of international transactions. Section 247 affirms
Canada's commitment to the internationally recognized arm's length principle and
endorses the 1995 OECD report.415 For taxpayers familiar with the OECD's work
on transfer pricing, the provisions in section 247 and Information Circular 87-2R
should not come as a surprise. Canada has long recognized that the governance of
MNEs requires continuity among the international community.4 16 Since Canada has
based its transfer pricing laws on the 1995 OECD report, taxpayers can use the
report as a Rosetta Stone to navigate through much of the complexity that plagues
transfer pricing issues.
With respect to MNEs, Canada's transfer pricing rules are not welcome news.
4 17
The transfer pricing penalty is overly harsh and can be easily triggered. Moreover,
the penalty is not proportionate to the offense.418 To make matters even worse, the
contemporaneous documentation requirements place a heavy burden on MNEs.
419
However, if there is a light at the end of the tunnel for MNEs, it is that more
countries will follow Canada' s lead. While this may sound contradictory, it is actual
complementary because the more countries that follow Canada's lead and adopt the
recommendations in the 1995 OECD report, the closer MNEs will be to an
international tax system that can efficiently administer the taxation of international
transactions.
414. See generally Turner, supra note 232 (noting that inflexibility will lead to taxpayers seeking APAs).
415. See generally Murray & Kingissepp, supra note 405 (stating that § 247 may end up being inconsistent
with the 1995 OECD report, even though Canada's new transfer pricing rules purport to follow this report).
416. See generally Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 71, at 902 (reporting that all the participants agree
transfer pricing is a global issue).
417. See generally Menyasz & Hirani, supra note 59 (stating that MNEs are concerned the new transfer
pricing rules will have a negative effect on the competitiveness of Canadian companies).
418. See 1995 OECD report, supra note 2, at 4.27 (recommending that OECD member countries ensure
their transfer pricing penalty system is proportionate to the offense).
419. See generally Levey &Borraccia, supra note 359 (stating that Canada's requirement that MNEs prepare
or obtain complete and accurate documentation is overly burdensome).

